Transcript

It's in the beginning of Parshas Kedoshim, rabosai.

קדושים תהיו היו פרושים מן העריות ומן העבירה שכל מקום שאתה מוצא גדר ערווה אתה מוצא קדושה.

Lashon Rashi. On the one hand, kedusha is associated with all mitzvos. אשר קדשנו במצוותיו וציוונו. Every person, or every area where there's kedusha means that there are additional mitzvos. We speak of kedushas kehuna, kohanim have extra mitzvos. We speak of kedushas mikdash, there's special dinim, special mitzvos which govern mikdash. So on one level, all mitzvos build and reflect kedusha. Right? It's a cyclical relationship. On the one hand, it's asher kidshanu bemitzvotav. The very fact of the mitzvah is mekadesh. On the other hand, it's the kiyum hamitzvah, it's the compliance with the mitzvah which is mekadesh. It's an upward spiral. But that notwithstanding, Rashi is highlighting that arayos within the galaxy of mitzvos stand out. And that kedusha in a sense is more of a function, more dependent upon being gador min haarayos than it is on the general reality of asher kidshanu bemitzvotav. And lechora the pshat in the sense that the same way when you build a building, there's something functionally unique and singular about the foundation. Every brick you use contributes towards the building that results, but the foundation obviously is singular in terms of its function within the overall building. In building kedusha, there's foundation, there are fundamentals. And that's what Rashi is saying, and this is half of what the Rambam says in hakdama to the Yad when he explains why Sefer Kedusha consists of on the one hand Hilchos Issurei Biah, on the other hand Hilchos Maachalos Assuros.

ספר חמישי אכללתי בו מצווה של ביאות אסורות ומצוות של מאכלות אסורות לפי שבשני העניינים האלו לפי שבשני העניינים האלו קידשנו המקום והבדילנו מן העמים בעריות ובמאכלות אסורות ובשניהם נאמר ואבדיל אתכם מן העמים אשר הבדלתי אתכם מן העמים וקראתי שם זה שם ספר זה ספר קדושה.

And again, you juxtapose this Rambam with the Rambam in Sefer Hamitzvos in the shorashim where he explains that you don't, you only count specific mitzvos in the minyan taryag, you don't count a pasuk like ushmartem es chukosai because that's not a distinct mitzvah, it's just being mizarez to keep all mitzvos. So the Rambam says an example of that is kedoshim tihyu and vehis-kadashtem because kedusha is realized through all mitzvos. So when you juxtapose this. Every mitzvah expresses and creates and contributes to the kedushah, but in terms of foundation, so it's davka these two areas. And half of that idea is reflected in Rashi also. Rashi doesn't have the maachalos asuros here, but the idea of geder ervah. אבל בתורת כהנים מצאתי סתם פרושים תהיו. Meaning that's Rashi's havanah in the Toras Kohanim. Rashi said that perushim tihyu, just contextually, given that where Rashi is coming from is easy to understand, right? This posuk at the beginning of Parshas Kedoshim is coming on the heels of the end of Acharei Mos, which concludes with the parsha of arayos.

אבל בתורת כהנים מצאתי סתם פרושים תהיו וכן שנו שם התקדשתם והייתם קדושים כי קדוש אני ה' כשם שאני קדוש כך אתם תהיו קדושים כשם שאני פרוש כך אתם תהיו פרושים. ולפי דעתי אין הפרישות הזו לפרוש מן העריות כדברי הרב.

Rashi's understanding of the perishus is sort of doubly restrictive according to the Ramban. Number one, it's arayos, davka that area of Torah. And number two, even there, even within that area of Torah, it's simply reinforcing what is already specified and already taught and already dictated in the Torah, as opposed to what we're about to see here B'ezras Hashem.

אבל הפרישות היא המוזכרת בכל מקום בתלמוד שבעליה נקראים פרושים.

When you find in Shas perushim, it doesn't mean just people who are meticulous, scrupulous about observing Parshas Acharei Mos, Parshas Arayos.

בו ענין כי התורה הזהירה בעריות ובמאכלים האסורים והתירה הביאה איש באשתו ואכילת הבשר והיין אם כן ימצא בעל התאוה מקום להיות שטוף בזמת אשתו או נשיו הרבות ולהיות כסובאי יין וכזוללי בשר למו וידבר כרצונו בכל הנבלות שלא הוזכר איסור זה בתורה והנה יהיה נבל ברשות התורה. לפיכך בא הכתוב אחרי שפירט האיסורים שאסר אותם לגמרי וצוה בדבר כללי שנהיה פרושים מן המותרות ימעיט במשגל כענין שאמרו שלא יהיו תלמידי חכמים מצוין אצל נשותיהן כתרנגולים ולא ישמש אלא לפי הצורך בקיום המצוה ממנו ויקדש עצמו מן היין במיעוטו כמו שקרא הכתוב הנזיר קדוש ויזכור הרעות הנזכרות ממנו בתורה בנח ובלוט וכן יפריש עצמו מן הטומאה אף על פי שלא הוזהרנו ממנה בתורה כענין שהזכירו בגדי עם הארץ מדרס לפרושים וכמו שנקרא הנזיר קדוש בשמרו מטומאת המת גם כן וגם ישמור פיו ולשונו מהתגאל בריבוי האכילה הגסה ומן הדבור הנמאס.

So what does the Ramban say? The Ramban says that absent—this is a just—it's clear and compelling, this is what the Ramban means, but it's just important to make sure that we have it straight. When the Ramban talks about naval bi-reshus ha-Torah, there is no such thing. There is no such thing as being a naval bi-reshus ha-Torah. The Ramban says if you wouldn't have a posuk of Kedoshim tihyu, so then that possibility would have existed. And that's what the posuk of Kedoshim tihyu comes to, as it were, close what would otherwise be a gap or what would otherwise be a breach that would invite a person to be a naval bi-reshus ha-Torah. so Kedoshim Tihyu closes that and there is no such thing. Now if a person would be Shatuf Bezimus Ishto or would be or באכילת בשר ושתיית יין כסובאי יין וכזוללי בשר so then he's violating Kedoshim Tihyu so it's not Berishus Hatorah. The Naval Birshus Hatorah is what would have been absent the Pasuk of Kedoshim Tihyu. So at first glance what the Ramban is telling us is that there's a Chiyuv for a person to recognize within Torah within Mitzvos certain core values certain orienting principles and to then extrapolate based upon those core values and principles beyond the specific Mitzvos which we have. So the Torah curbs the Yetzer Hara through the long list of Arayos and Bi'os Asuros. The Ibn Ezra and the Rambam say that on the level of Ta'amei Mitzvos that the Arayos include those relatives that a person is most likely to spend time with and it's Davka here where a person could have become a Naval in terms of being Shatuf Shatuf Bizima. So the Torah has Mitzvos. We're supposed to recognize not just the Guf Hamitzva we're supposed to recognize the Leiv Hamitzva the Nishmas Hamitzva as well, the core value the principle which inheres and then extrapolate and apply it in other circumstances. Case in point that Kedoshim Tihyu says learn the lesson of Arayos learn the lesson of Ma'achalos Asuros and therefore don't only avoid Arayos and Bi'os Asuros and Neveilos Utreifos but even in one's own personal married life even within one's Achila of kosher food of kosher products that a person should be moderate and that there should be a degree of Perishus there should be a degree of abstinence in how a person lives. So Lefi Mei'ata again where Kedoshim Tihyu says is this Chiyuv to extrapolate and to apply and that's what the Ramban says that's what the Ramban says Vichein Derech Hatorah I'm skipping a few lines וכן דרך התורה לפרוט ולכלול בכיוצא בזה. And this is not an isolated example not an isolated case in the Torah but this is fundamental to the Torah's whole approach of teaching and instructing. That first the Torah specifies and then it generalizes. So for instance

כי אחרי אזהרות פרטי הדינין בכל משא ומתן שבין בני אדם

so the Torah gives us many many specifics regulating our interaction Bein Adam Lachaveiro Lo Tignov Lo Tigzol Velo Sonu Ushear Ha'azharos. amar baklal va'asisa hayashar vehatov. So then the Torah says, recognize what those core values are bein adam l'chaveiro, and now apply them even beyond just literally is this gneiva, is this gezel, is this ona'as mamon, is this ona'as devarim, right? Apply it beyond that,

שיכניס בעשיית היושר וההשויה לפנים משורת הדין כאשר אפרש בהגיעו למקומו ברצון הקדוש ברוך הוא.

Okay. But the emes is that what Kedoshim Tihyu and the Ramban means is not only this. It's not only that, again if you sort of depict it spatially, it's not only sort of that without Kedoshim Tihyu so you have this corpus of mitzvos, arayos, bi'as assur etc., halachos of dibbur, לא תלך רכיל בעמיך etc. And then be'atzem Kedoshim Tihyu it's enlarged because Kedoshim Tihyu says extrapolate and apply. And absent Kedoshim Tihyu a person is left with a very constricted and truncated version, a very incomplete version of Torah and mitzvos. What the Ramban is saying runs much deeper than that. It's lich'ora when the Ramban said what a person would have been absent the mitzvah of Kedoshim Tihyu, he says a person would have been a naval bireshus haTorah. So what does the word naval mean? What's the taitch of the word naval? So Ramban later in Ha'azinu on the pasuk of, if the Ramban you're using is a Devarim in it, take a look rabbosai,

הלה' תגמלו זאת עם נבל ולא חכם הלא הוא אביך קנך הוא עשך ויכננך.

So עם נבל ולא חכם. So the Ramban says ולפי דעתי העושה טובת חנם יקרא נדיב. When a person who does a tova, he bestows kindness, some benefaction, and no vested interest, no indebtedness on his part, yikarei nadiv, umeshaleim ra'ah, what's the opposite end of the spectrum? A person who repays good with bad,

ומשלם רעה למי שהטיב עמו יקרא נבל. והוא שאמר לא יקרא עוד לנבל נדיב כי הוא ההפך. ולכך אמרו על נבל הכרמלי

Kishmo ken hu,

נבל שמו ונבלה עמו, כי דוד עשה עמו טובה והוא לא רצה לשלם לו גמול.

Then the Ramban suggests that maybe the etymology of the word Naval is that bais and pei, again in the grouping of the various letters of the aleph-beis, so bais and pei are grouped together, so they're sometimes interchangeable, so

יתכן שיקרא כן בעבור שהוא נופל מבני אדם, כאשר יאמר כאלה נובלת עלה.

Like a tree whose leaves are falling off, right? So novlos are things that fall off. Again, Naval, Nofel. So a Naval is someone who's Nofel mibnei adam. He's a person, but he doesn't live up to that. But his conduct is not, is not equal to, to what he is, right? He falls short of, of the mark. ויקרא המת נבלה שנפלה לארץ ומתה. Right, only, only something alive can, can hold itself up. Something, an animal that dies, so it falls, it crumbles to the ground. So a Naval is, again, in its original context, is someone who is indebted, who should be makir tova, and instead is משלם רעה למי שהיטיב עמו. So it's not only that he isn't actively doing what's right. It's not only that he's actively doing something wrong, but, but there's sort of the ultimate contradiction in what he's doing. Here's a person who's my benefactor and not only don't I acknowledge it, but I'm repaying him with ra'ah tachas tovah. That sort of ultimate nefilah from the norms of, of decency. Again, in the form of contradiction. The Ksav v'Hakabalah says in, in it's not, I don't know if it's the same, but it's even, I don't know, the point is even it's easier to, to see more sharply. He says neveilah is something when the you have the, let's say an animal, an animal dies. So initially, right, before the, the its carcass will begin to decompose, so outwardly the animal looks no different than it did a second ago when it was alive. So the outer shell or the outer crust is there, but the, the inner defining essential quality is missing. And in that sense, it's almost a fraud, as it were, right? If, you know, if you were looking to, to buy a pet and, and and you think the pet is sleeping and it turns out that the pet is, is dead, so it's mamash mikach ta'os. It's not, it's not a slight difference. When you have this lifeless shell, this hollow or, or empty emptiness which is, is covered over on the surface, so that, that's neveilah, the Ksav v'Hakabalah says. It's similar to, to this Ramban. Not identical, but similar. Either way, the pshat in the Ramban's Naval birshus haTorah, rabosai, is not, is not only that if a person isn't mkayem Kedoshim Tihyu, so he's living within this constricted version of Torah, it's that he makes a caricature of that part of Torah. It's not only that Torah instructs us more than just being nizhar me'arayos, more than just being nizhar me'machalos asuros, and if I'm not mekayem chas v'shalom Kedoshim Tihyu, so I'm missing all that more. No, what the Ramban is telling us is that without kedoshim, I'm making a caricature of of the explicit parts of Torah. If a person is nizhar me'machalos asuros but ochel achila gassa of of kosher food, so that, it's not just that that's that he's missing again all the as it were the simanim and se'ifim which are generated by the pasuk Kedoshim Tihyu. No, it it makes a lie out of his zehirus in the machalos asuros because the the core, the inner core of those mitzvos, bein hayeser, part of that inner core is the moderation, the the degree of abstinence and when the person combines sort of this life of lack of restraint but all the food's going to be kosher, so then that makes a caricature out of what Kashrus is. So it's not only that absent Kedoshim Tihyu, that's what it means naval birshus haTorah means that even in those parts of Torah he would be falling short, even in Parshas Acharei Mos, the person would be falling short if he was shotuf bizimas ishto. Even in Parshas Shmini in in terms of machalos asuros, if the person can can eat, can be living hedonistically, so he's falling short not not only in that area. No, he's falling short in Parshas Shmini. That's the significance, or or say it plug in the Kisvei HaKabala, so then it's easier to see, but it's already it's there within the Ramban. You have this outer core, but the outer excuse me the outer surface, the outer shell, but the outer shell without the inside is a caricature, is a caricature. If someone tells you that they're going to introduce you to a to an adam gadol, so you get all excited and and they show you, see he's right there he's waiting for you. And when you get closer you see it was it's an ingenious wax statue of of of that person. So that's a cruel hoax. It's not just that it isn't the person, it's a hoax, right? When you have something where you have an outer shell and and you don't have the the essential inner core, so that's a caricature of of what's supposed to be. And that's the omek hapshat here in the Ramban's Kedoshim Tihyu. Absent the everything, it's not just that that the fullness of Torah requires Kedoshim Tihyu, everything in Torah requires Kedoshim Tihyu. The same way the same way if a person can figure out how to sort of wrong his friend, but it won't be technically gneiva, it won't be technically gezel, it won't be technically lifnei iver, so it's it's not just that he's being over on v'asisa hayashar vehatov, he's making a caricature out of the out of the lo tignovu, he's making a a caricature out of the the lo tigzol. You know as we bechasdei Hashem in in this country lehavdil Eretz Yisrael as well are emerging from the pandemic, it's obviously not the case in in some other parts of the world. The pandemic imposed willy-nilly a degree of prishus upon us in all the disruption that it created. So in many areas we should be very eager chadesh yameinu kikeidem to be able to be back in the Beis Medrash, to be able to be back in shul. In all that we want to revert back at the very least to status quo ante. But there were some sort of patterns that were disrupted which we don't necessarily want to go back to, in terms of maybe certain types of excess that weren't consistent with Kedoshim Tihyu. Once we accurately understand what the novel Reshus HaTorah means, that it's indispensable for kol haTorah kulla, it's almost impossible to exaggerate the importance, almost impossible to exaggerate the centrality. In both learning as well as appreciating Torah mitzvos, so we need to recognize and maintain the right balance. On the one hand, there's maybe taking a little bit of a homiletical license, there's klaloseha miSinai, that there are values and there are principles. On the other hand, there's pertoseha miSinai. It's not enough to say that, you know, I'm going to eat moderately, so hayos she'ani eating moderately I'll have a cheeseburger for lunch, so obviously that's also a terrible distortion and also would make a caricature of Torah. But in paying scrupulous attention to the pertoseha, we shouldn't lose sight of the klaloseha. In focusing on the klaloseha, we shouldn't in any way lessen our commitment and our zeal to the dikduk bepertoseha. The third example that the Ramban gives of lifrot ulichlol, so the first is Kedoshim Tihyu, the second is Ve'asisa Hayashar Vehatov, and the third is vechein be'inyan HaShabbos, the Ramban says אסר המלאכות בלאו והטרחים בעשה כללי שנאמר תשבות. Again issur melacha on the one hand is pratim u-pirtei pratim, all of which are vital and the Torah Shleimah, but me'idach gisa, Shabbos isn't just a day of technical compliance with issur melacha. It's a day of tishbos that a person has respite from from mundane and is and a person is supposed to recognize that in issur melacha. He's supposed to recognize that klal in issur melacha and and that should inform the way a person again, not only what he abstains from on Shabbos, but how he spends the day of Shabbos. I think the meforshim explain, like for instance you have in the beginning of Parshat Vayakhel. So

אלה הדברים אשר צוה ה׳ לעשת אתם, ששת ימים תעשה מלאכה וביום השביעי יהיה לכם קדש שבת שבתון לה׳ כל העשה בו מלאכה יומת. לא תבערו אש בכל משבתיכם ביום השבת.

So what's the אלה הדברים אשר צוה ה׳ לעשת אתם? So some meforshim say the la'asos osam is referring to the melachos ha-mishkan, but the Torah before proceeding to that אלה הדברים אשר צוה ה׳ לעשת אתם says, but just remember, have in mind that everything I tell you about the Mishkan is not on Shabbos, not to be m'chalel Shabbos. And others say no, it says אלה הדברים אשר צוה ה׳ לעשת אתם and then it's Shabbos, so the la'asos osam refers to Shabbos. Ay, but the Torah just proceeds to tell us what not to do. It says כל העשה בו מלאכה יומת and לא תבערו אש בכל משבתיכם ביום השבת. So that's exactly this idea of the Ramban, that yes, the the the outer expression again the pratosha which is equally absolutely crucial, indispensable, vital, the pratosha on the pratisdik level it's shelo la'asos, but but the core, the shelo la'asos, it means that a person is generating a creating a mindset to be able to do, to be able to do in ruchniyos, in Torah, in avodas Hashem. The lo sa'aseh melacha is la'asos. The core of of the of the lo sa'aseh melacha is the la'asos. That's why when let's say if we're thinking about something and and it seems to us that we can't really correlate the proposed action, activity, whatever it is, with anything specific in hilchos Shabbos, but we sort of have a sense well, it's not shabbosdik. So the way that should register is not that it's really mutar, but you know, it's not shabbosdik. No, if it's not shabbosdik, so then it's not mutar because that's exactly this klal of lifrot ve-lichlol and and the fact that it doesn't align with the melacha of me'abed or or any of the avos melachos doesn't mean that the default is is that it's mutar. No, it it means that that it could be part of the lichlol, not necessarily part of the lifrot. Certainly one perspective, by no means exclusive or absolute, but one perspective on this derech haTorah that the Ramban is talking about of lifrot u'lichlol is the fact for Torah to be given to us as it was and is intended, Torah needs on one level to be finite. We're finite. We need to be able to finish Chumash. We need to be able to have a cycle of Kriat HaTorah where we make our way through Chumash. The number of different types of situations that shishim ribo individuals will find themselves in over the course of millennia is for all practical purposes, not literally so obviously, but for all practical purposes virtually infinite. So clearly the Torah cannot, because of our limitations, cannot specifically address every circumstance that every single yachid will encounter over the course of his lifetime. I don't know, you'd have to live longer than Methuselah to get through one cycle of Kriat HaTorah were that the case. So it has to be lifrot u'lichlol. It has to be that the Torah imparts core values and illustrates what principles should be and then beyond that is ve'idach zil gmor. It's just because of who we are, what we are, it's unimaginable that it could be otherwise. My father zichrono livracha used to juxtapose to this Ramban what he understood to be a similar idea in the Sefer Chasidim. Sefer Chasidim comments on the Gemara in Berachot in the second perek where the Gemara says לעולם יהא אדם ערום ביראה, right? Literally a person should be cunning in his yirat shamayim. So what does that mean? Again, so arum there in a positive sense, not intended with an association with a נחש היה ערום מכל חית השדה. Arum in, again, arum just means the same way genius, there can be good genius, there can be evil genius. Arum cunning. So what does it mean for a person to be cunning in yirat shamayim? So the Sefer Chasidim gives I think two examples from Chumash of what it means to be arum beyira. One is from Parshat Matot. In Parshat Matot the Torah records that after the milchama against Midian, so Moshe Rabbeinu goes out and ויקצוף משה על פקודי החיל. Moshe Rabbeinu angrily rebukes the officers and says hachiyitem kol nekeiva? How could you do such a thing? Hen hema hayu, they were the provocateurs for cheit and the mageifa that ensued. So how could you have spared them? So the Sefer Chasidim has a remarkable he'ara. Says when you look at the marching orders that they were given when they went out to fight Midian, so they were never told to kill the women. And yet when they come back Moshe Rabbeinu has this grievance against them, hachiyitem kol nekeiva. Says the Sefer Chasidim, no, that's לעולם יהא אדם ערום ביראה. They should have understood. They should have understood. How were they supposed to understand? So that's exactly this idea of the Ramban of lifrot u'lichlol. Based on all the pratim of Torah a person is supposed to then be able to extrapolate to situations which are not literally explicitly described in the Chumash, in Shas, in Shulchan Aruch. I think the second, I'm not sure, I think the second example the Sefer Chasidim gives is from Bilaam in ויחר אף אלהים כי הולך הוא. What do you mean ויחר אף אלהים כי הולך הוא? Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave him permission. So what do you mean ויחר אף אלהים כי הולך הוא? He should have understood.

אם לקרא לך באו האנשים קום לך אתם ואפס את הדבר אשר אדבר אליך אתו תשמור לדבר,

I forget how the pasuk goes. It should have been clear that Hakadosh Baruch Hu sort of begrudgingly saying if your... If you're bent on sending the meraglim, I'm not going to stop you from sending the meraglim, but clearly, clearly that doesn't mean that there was any approval. The Kli Yakar has a similar idea in the following context, in the different opinions in Chazal as to what the cheit of Nadav and Avihu was. So one of the opinions Rashi quotes, this is one of the opinions that Rashi quotes also, is that they were shetuyei yayin when they were makriv the ketoret. And what's the raya? Because right after the Torah narrates the death of Nadav and Avihu, it says

וידבר השם אל אהרן יין ושכר אל תשת אתה ובניך אתך.

So the Kli Yakar says שוין צו זיין פונקט פארקערט. If you see the mitzvah hasn't been given yet, then al korcha that couldn't have been the aveira because if the parsha of shetuyei yayin is first being taught now, so that's l'chora the best proof that that couldn't have been. Go find something that's in Parshat Yisro, find something that's in Parshat Mishpatim. It can't be something that's first being taught after the demise of Nadav and Avihu. And the Kli Yakar says no, because they should have understood hagam that it hadn't been said, the expectation was that they should have understood that a Kohen who is shatuy yayin shouldn't have done the avodah. It's not identical, it's not exactly what the Ramban is saying. The common denominator, the tzad hashaveh, is the need to know what to do even when and the requirement even when a circumstance is not explicitly addressed. Lav davka that the again, how could you know? Maybe it can be a simple svara that tells you, or the Ramban is telling you it's based on the level that the ability lichlohl is based on the level. I don't mean to identify, but there's a certain overlap between what they're saying. Okay, maybe we'll stop here. Gut Shabbos.