Transcript

So we saw that the Ramban gives two other examples of the דרך התורה לפרט ולכלל besides the original context of Kedoshim Tihyu. He says the same thing is true in terms of the relationship of Issur Malacha and Shabbasos. And the second example, the second additional example alongside Kedoshim Tihyu that he gives is Ve'asisa Hayashar Vehatov. So maybe we'll take a look if you have it, you can get it on the computer. So if we take a look here in Vaeschanan on the pasuk of Ve'asisa Hayashar Vehatov, what is it? It's pasuk zehu? It's perek vav pasuk yod ches. But maybe for a little bit of context, we'll begin just reading in the Chumash pasuk yod zayin.

שמור תשמרון את מצות ה' אלקיכם ועדתיו וחקיו אשר צוך. ועשית הישר והטוב בעיני ה' למען ייטב לך ובאת וירשת את הארץ הטבה אשר נשבע ה' לאבתיך.

So Ve'asisa Hayashar Vehatov. You see that in the Ramban here?

ועשית הישר והטוב בעיני ה', על דרך הפשט יאמר, תשמרו מצות ה' ועדתיו וחקותיו

meaning that that was the previous pasuk, okay? That was pasuk yod zayin. And what should your mindset be in the shemiras ha'edos vehachukim? What should your mindset be? ותכוין בעשייתם לעשות הטוב והישר בעיניו בלבד. You should do it lishmah. Maybe we'll come back to that a little bit later this morning, ken? Ulema'an Yitav Lach is not your conscious goal or motivation, but Ulema'an Yitav Lach havtachah.

יאמר כי בעשותך הטוב בעיניו ייטב לך כי ה' מטיב לטובים ולישרים בלבותם. ורבותינו בזה מדרש יפה כי אמרו ועשית הישר והטוב זו פשרה ולפנים משורת הדין.

And the kavanah b'zeh, how does Ve'asisa Hayashar Vehatov mean פשרה ולפנים משורת הדין and bichlal, what's Chazal's understanding in the pasuk that yields this

זו פשרה ולפנים משורת הדין? כי מתחילה אמר שתשמרו חקותיו ועדתיו אשר צוך.

Follow all the explicit, direct mitzvos in the Torah. And now it says

גם באשר לא צוך תן דעתך לעשות הטוב והישר בעיניו.

So here's the ha'edos vehachukim is the lifrat and then the Ve'asisa Hayashar Vehatov is the lichlal. גם באשר לא צוך, even when you find a circumstance, a situation where there is no direct, explicit mitzvah,

תן דעתך לעשות הטוב והישר בעיניו כי הוא אוהב הטוב והישר. וזה עניין גדול,

says the Ramban,

לפי שאי אפשר לזכור בתורה כל הנהגות האדם עם שכניו ורעיו וכל משאו ומתנו ותקוני הישוב והמדינות כולם. אבל אחרי שהסביר מהם הרבה

but after the Torah does give many specifics and directives such as

כגון לא תלך רכיל לא תקום ולא תטור ולא תעמוד על דם רעך

lo tekalel cheresh mipnei seiva takum vechayotze bahen

חזר לומר בדרך כלל שיעשה הטוב והישר בכל דבר עד שיכנס בזה הפשרה ולפנים משורת הדין.

So Chazal are illustrating what an hanhaga of hatov vehayashar would be, right? When Chazal say veasita hatov vehayashar that it means פשרה ולפנים משורת הדין, so Ramban is saying it's not we're not looking to see how the word tov and yashar means פשרה ולפנים משורת הדין. No, פשרה ולפנים משורת הדין are examples of the type of behavior, are examples of the applications of this klal of veasita hatov vehayashar. So comes out according to the Ramban a very and again and this is what the Ramban means in back in Parshas Kedoshim that this is the third instance of the lifrat ulichlal that here too the Torah is extrapolating basically for all bein adam lechavero. This is how the Torah does contain a tzivui. Again here it's in the form of principles of behavior and values which then are to be applied to every situation. Every situation. But then yitachen something very remarkable emerges. We generally translate and understand or I don't know understand and translate I guess first you try to understand then you try to translate but lifnim mishuras hadin means that a person is required to do A but he's not mechuyav to go beyond that but it's lifnim mishuras hadin to go beyond that. But lichora veasita hayashar vehatov the Ramban our Ramban equates it with shabbaton u'shabbos with kedoshim tihiyu as a mitzvah a chiyuv. There was nothing optional about shabbaton u'shabbos there's nothing optional about kedoshim tihiyu and if veasita hayashar vehatov and veasita hayashar vehatov is mentioned in the same breath so it's also a chiyuv right? It's the chiyuv hakolel which follows up on the chiyuvim hapratim. But then what does that mean then? So how is so what does lifnim mishuras hadin mean now? So it doesn't mean what we're accustomed to thinking its meaning because the Ramban is saying that again Chazal say lifnim mishuras hadin is included in veasita hayashar vehatov and the Ramban is saying that there's nothing which is optional there's nothing which is lifnim mishuras hadin about veasita hayashar vehatov so there's nothing which is lifnim mishuras hadin about lifnim mishuras hadin. So what does it mean? So lichora davar halomed meinyano. Chazal mention lifnim mishuras hadin here in the same breath with peshara right? It's פשרה ולפנים משורת הדין. What what's the difference between between pshara and and din in in context of Beis Din? What what's what's the difference if if two people go for for a Din Torah and and if if it will be paskened based on pure din or if if it will be paskened based on on on pshar? What's what's the difference? So likhora the difference is that with pshara, I mean obviously pshara is also emes. The Torah doesn't doesn't provide an option and and we hold that mitzvah livtzo'ah. We hold that that it's preferable that that the Din Torah be adjudicated based on on pshar rather than on din. Which is what Batei Din do. Batei Din pasken pshar. So so what does it mean? How can pshar be be emes if if it's obviously going to differ from din which is emes also? So you can have two, you can have emes on two different levels. You can have emes sort of a-contextually or you can have emes which I think in in philosophical terms it's called situational ethics. The emes is that pshar in in the context of pshar, so we do accept the notion of situational ethics. And the difference between pshar and din in context of of a Din Torah is is that din represents sort of din, it represents emes on a call that on an ideal level on an a-contextual level. You're not misyaches to I don't know who the ba'alei d'varim are. Right? Din is is לא תהדר פני גדול ולא תשא פני דל. It doesn't make a difference who who the people are. It doesn't make a difference who who the people are. You're not looking at it situationally. Mah she'kein pshar, you're looking at it situationally. And in that sense they're both emes, right? They're they're emes on on different levels. And the difference of opinion in in the first perek of Sanhedrin as to whether or not pshara is regarding pshara is which optimally in context of a Din Torah, so which which level of emes should we be should we be striving for? We should be we should be striving for that a-contextual level of of emes? Or no, we should be striving for for call it contextual situational emes. So השתא דאתינא להכי that that's and that likhora is the pshat according to all in in what distinguishes pshar from din and why pshar is also is also emes. It's not that pshar it's not that chas v'shalom pshar is rachmanus. No, that's also you takeh and that that's also true. But but pshar is also emes, it's just emes on on a different level than than the din is. That's takeh the lashon hag'mara in Sanhedrin, right? The lashon hag'mara in Sanhedrin is אמת ומשפט שלום שפטו בשעריכם. So how do you have emes and shalom? So that's pshar. So you see that it's not that it's not that pshar sort of abandons emes. No, no, chas v'shalom, that's not the pshat. But but it means that it's situational situational. It's it's what the emes is given. Given all the variables here, not just oh. So there's a, it's a she'ilah b'alma. No, but given all the reality of the situation in addition. So takhles in that sense what לפנים משורת הדין means is, it's לפנים משורת הדין when you think of din, again it's not the same as peshara in one sense. It's the same as peshara in the sense that peshara represents an emes which isn't specified, right? Because in the case of peshara it's not specified because it's situational. And לפנים משורת הדין also, meaning the din is lo tirtzach. The din is lo sikom, lo sitor, לא תעמוד על דם רעך. Those are direct dinim. Beyond that, there is no direct din of bar metzra, right? It doesn't say. Where does it say in the Chumash that you should give the first right of refusal when you're selling your field to the person who owns the neighboring field? Where's the pasuk in Chumash that says that? So the answer is, no, there is no pasuk that says that directly, explicitly. And in that sense it's comparable to peshara, that you're again you're dealing with an emes which isn't specified. So לפנים משורת הדין then for the Ramban isn't implying optional behavior. It's implying behavior which is, call it an unspecified mitzvah. The same way peshara is an emes which you can't find explicitly in the Shach or the Sma in Choshen Mishpat. You can find the principles based on which you decide the peshara, but you're not going to find this exact psak in the Shach or the Sma because the whole point is that it's situational. And that's what the two have in common. But kumt ois then that לפנים משורת הדין is, at least sometimes for the Ramban, it doesn't have the meaning that we associate with it as something optional which is only begeder midas chasidus. I don't know, you have to go through all the cases in the Gemara to see whether or not this is going to be true in every case. In some case, again, I don't know offhand if the Ramban means this for every case. Let's say, so the Gemara in Berachos about maaseh is if you have שלושה שאכלו כאחד חייבין לזמן. So the din is that echad mafsik lishnayim ואין שניים מפסיקין לאחד. So if two people are ready to bench, so the third one has to stop and answer. If one person's ready to bench and two are not ready to bench, so they're not mechuyav to stop. He has to wait until they're ready. The Gemara tells a story epes about Rav Papa or someone, one of them Amora'im, that there was a case of that one was ready to bench and they were mafsik. The Gemara says no, it was, he was doing לפנים משורת הדין. He was doing לפנים משורת הדין. Again, so without the Ramban, no, that was a midas chasidus. He really the two were within their rights to say that we're not ready to bench, so you just need to wait. Maybe according to the Ramban, what the pshat in our gemara is is that you sort of have to evaluate this this situation on from two aspects. Aspect number one is what's the din when you have a chabura of three? Again, so the fact that they wash and sit down and begin the meal together means there's going to be a chov hazimmun. Right? You have three three people they sit down to eat together, so then they were miztaref to a chabura and there's going to be a chiyuv zimmun. So question number one is, how do you determine when the chabura is ready, mechuyav, whatever the word is, to be mezamen or mevarech? So the answer is it's a chabura of three. It depends upon the rov. It depends upon the two. So that's one aspect under which you have to consider the shaila. But the other aspect under which you have to consider the shaila is, okay, so dalmei hacha what my chiyuvim are mizad hachabura. But what about my chiyuvim as a mentch? What about my chiyuvim in terms of being considerate to other people? So mizad that, all things being equal, if there's not some reason that I can't do it, so I don't know, maybe the Ramban would say that it really is a chiyuv in again, a chiyuv מצד ועשית הישר והטוב, not מצד דיני חבורה ודיני זימון. Ayin sham. So let's see another example of lifnim mishuras hadin is that זקן ואינו לפי כבודו is pattur from hashavas aveida. Or the Rambam has the case, let's say you find an aveida achar ye'ush. So an aveida achar ye'ush really belongs to you. Finders keepers, losers weepers, after after after ye'ush. But the Rambam writes אף על פי ששלו הרוצה לילך בדרך הטוב והישר, right, so he's referring to the same ma'amar chazal that the Ramban is quoting. This is here in perek yod aleph of gezeila va'aveida,

ועושה לפנים משורת הדין מחזיר את האבידה לישראל כשיתן את סימניה.

So again and as well as we mentioned the case of זקן ממרא לפי כבודו. So what does the lifnim mishurat hadin mean here? It also can be construed as a chiyuv on one level. This havanah you certainly find mofurash in the rishonim. I forget who it is, but I think maybe in one of his written divrei Torah. I think the רבנו זלמן זכרונו לברכה quotes, I think it's the Smak, the Sefer Mitzvot Katan, who has as one of the mitzvot d'oraita to do lifnim mishurat hadin. So you see clearly that what lifnim mishurat hadin means is that it's something beyond what's explicit, but not necessarily that what is beyond what is explicit is a middat chasidut, is optional. L'chora he is including it in the minyan hamitzvot. So then the domain as it were of kedoshim tihyu is basically a person's middot, right? A person's again, in particular, the person's involvement with gashmiut, that he shouldn't be שטוף בזימת אשתו או נשיו, that he shouldn't be zolel v'sovei. So kedoshim tihyu is the l'khlo in again, a person's middot, but especially... Especially in the area of physicality, of chomriyos. And V’asisa ha-yoshar ve-ha-tov is the lichlal in terms of a person’s bein adam l’chavero. The pshat is that you don’t find in the Rambam, aderaba, you find that the Rambam in Sefer Hamitzvos in the shorashim when he talks about not counting, not including in minyan hamitzvos, mitzvos which are just kelalos of all other mitzvos, such as ושמרתם את מצותי וחקותי. So that’s not a new mitzvah, it’s not breaking any new ground, it’s just the Torah’s exhortation to do all mitzvos. So the Rambam says no, the taryag mitzvos are 613 distinct mitzvos. It has to have something, some new mandate, some ground which isn’t covered by other mitzvos. And one of the examples the Rambam gives of what doesn’t belong in minyan hamitzvos is kedoshim tihyu. That’s one of his examples. So clearly the Rambam does not have the Ramban’s understanding of what kedoshim tihyu means. But what about, what does that mean in terms of the Rambam system? So then we should decide to pasken like the Rambam, not the Ramban, and we should go party, no? Is that the implication, rabosai? Do not leave, do not leave until we get to the answer here, rabosai. So lichora the pshat is that what for the Ramban is included in kedoshim tihyu and in V’asisa ha-yoshar ve-ha-tov, for the Rambam it’s all in ve-halachta bi-drachav. Clearly the Ramban has a different understanding of ve-halachta bi-drachav, but for the Rambam basically ve-halachta bi-drachav, let’s say the Ramban says if you didn’t have the pasuk of kedoshim tihyu, so a person could be shatuf be-zima. He could avoid arayos and avoid niddah and still be shatuf be-zima. And a person could be, if you didn’t have kedoshim tihyu, he could be zolel ve-sovei. So according to the Rambam, it’s clear no you couldn’t, mitzad ve-halachta bi-drachav, mitzad the midah beinonis, such a lifestyle is clearly prohibited. There wouldn’t have been this loophole that a person could have been naval be-reshus ha-Torah. And lichora the pshat here, you hear this rabosai? The way the Rambam learns pshat in the pasuk in Va'eschanan, V’asisa ha-yoshar ve-ha-tov, the Rambam writes here in Hilchos De'os in Perek Aleph in Halachos Aleph through Gimmel, so the Rambam describes the extremes:

שני קצוות הרחוקות זו מזו בכל דעה ודעה אינן דרך טובה.

Right? The implication being that the middle is tova, right? The ktzavos, the extremes, are not tova, the middle is tova, right?

ואין ראוי לו לאדם ללכת בהן ולא ללמדן לעצמו ואם מצא טבעו נוטה לאחת מהן או מוכן לאחת מהן או שכבר למד אחת מהן ונהג בה יחזיר עצמו למוטב וילך בדרך הטובים והיא הדרך הישרה.

So the Rambam describes and defines the middle as derech ha-tova, derech ha-tovim, and derech ha-yeshara. He reinforces that in the beginning of Halacha Dalet, derech ha-yeshara, הדרך הישרה היא מדה בינונית שבכל דעה ודעה. And then he says it once more explicitly at the end of Halacha Hei,

ומצוים אנו ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינוניים והם הדרכים הטובים והישרים.

So it’s clear that for the Rambam V’asisa ha-yoshar ve-ha-tov is reinforcing... He agrees with the Ramban that it's this sort of overarching principle, but for the Rambam, everything lichora that the Ramban includes either under Kedoshim or under Ve'asita Hayashar Vehatov, for the Rambam, it's all already subsumed within Vehalachta Bidrachav. The Bein Adam L'chavero is part of

מהו רחום אף אתה תהיה רחום מהו נקרא חנון אף אתה תהיה חנון.

All the Bein Adam L'chaveros of of which the Ramban includes in Ve'asita Hayashar Vehatov, the Rambam does also, but for him Ve'asita Hayashar Vehatov means something basically is a paraphrase of Vehalachta Bidrachav because Tov V'Yashar is is the Middah Habeinonit. And as we have discussed, but lichora that's the pshat when when the Rambam writes in Perek Bet of Hilchos Teshuva. The Rambam says Midarkei HaTeshuva, Beis Daled in Hilchos Teshuva:

מדרכי התשובה להיות השב צועק תמיד לפני ה' בבכייה ובתחנונים ועושה צדקה כפי כחו ומתרחק הרבה מן הדבר שחטא בו ומשנה שמו כלומר שאני אחר ואיני אותו האיש שעשה אותן המעשים ומשנה מעשיו כולם לטובה ולדרך ישרה וגולה ממקומו.

So the nosei keilim, the the classical nosei keilim already point out that this is the Rambam quoting Rabbi Yitzchak's memra of arba'ah devarim in Gemara Rosh Hashanah of ארבעה דברים מקרעין גזר דינו של אדם, tzedakah, tza'akah, shinuy hashem, and shinuy ma'aseh. So the Rambam says ומשנה מעשיו כולם לטובה ולדרך ישרה. The question is: what does that mean? The Rambam's just telling us sort of what the goal is but he's not telling us how to do it. He's telling us, you know, just be better, you need to be better. Ve'idach zil gemor, go figure out what that means, maybe, maybe. But lichora when the Rambam says ומשנה מעשיו כולם לטובה ולדרך ישרה, what he means is the one principle that can transform everything a person does is is the Middah Habeinonit. The Middah Habeinonit affects everything a person does. It affects how a person talks, how much he talks, what tone of voice he talks in. It affects every action. Every action is something that needs to be calibrated al pi al pi the Middah Habeinonit. So when the Rambam says ומשנה מעשיו כולם לטובה ולדרך ישרה, so the Rambam, no, he's not just telling us, you know, you need to improve in everything. The Rambam is telling us also that Tov and Yashar are code words in in in the Rambam. It could be, I don't know, I think this is what we suggested once, but what does the Rambam have in mind again by having, going back to the Rambam, it's the pasuk in Chumash, it's not his hamtza'ah. What's the mechaven here in describing and defining the midat habeinonit again with two adjectives? It's tov v'yashar. Right? מצוונו ללכת בדרכים אלו הטובים והישרים. So what does the Rambam have in mind with the two adjectives? So itachen as follows: when you look at the examples here in Perek Aleph when the Rambam is talking about the midat habeinonit and he's illustrating it, so it's quite clear that the Rambam doesn't see what we call bein adam l'atzmo and bein adam l'chavero as two different realms. Meaning whether a person is moderate in his, again, in his eating habits, and whether or not a person is kind and sensitive to the appropriate extent and the appropriate degree to his chaver is the same yesod, is the same principle. When the Rambam talks about

ולכן לא יתאווה אלא לדברים שהגוף צריך להן ואי אפשר לחיות בזולתן כעניין שנאמר צדיק אוכל לשובע נפשו.

Then the Rambam talks about לא יקפוץ ידו ביותר, don't be too stingy, ולא יפזר כל ממונו, don't give away all your money to tzedakah either, you're not supposed to do that either, אלא נותן צדקה כפי מיסת ידו. So whether it's what we call bein adam l'atzmo or whether what we call bein adam l'chavero, it's the same yesod. There's one yesod here. It's the same yesod that has to be balanced. It has to be balanced in terms of how a person eats. It has to be balanced in terms of how he interacts with others. But it's the same yesod. So hashta d'asinu l'hacha, itachen that's the pshat. Maybe דרכים אלו הקרואים טובים וישרים is טוב ה' לכל ורחמיו על כל מעשיו. Maybe the tov meaning that these drachim are tov in how they will translate and shape and guide a person's behavior bein adam l'chavero. But they're also yesharim in, yashar doesn't have any necessarily sense or connotation of there being a bein adam l'chavero context. And that's what the Rambam says, these drachim are tovim v'yesharim. It's not two different, it's not that there are certain klalim in bein adam l'chavero and then there are other klalim in bein adam l'atzmo. No, it's one klal. One klal. Again it may be that a person is more challenged in, it's not that it may be, it is the case that a person itachen is going to be more challenged. In one context as opposed to the other, but it's not, it's not two different areas which have different, different guiding klalim. These drachim allow you to be tov la'acherim and yashar b'atzmecha. Ramban concludes ואפילו מה שאמרו פרק נאה ודיבורו בנחת עם הבריות. The fact that a person speaks nicely, softly with other people is also included in v'asita hayashar v'hatov. So where do you get this from? So Ramban gave us the examples: lo telech rachil, don't talk lashon hara, לא תקום ולא תטור, don't tikom v'lo titor, לא תעמוד על דם רעך, don't let your friend drown, lo tekallel cheresh, mipnei seivah takum. How did we figure out דיבורו בנחת עם הבריות? How did we figure that out? I know because I shouldn't talk lashon hara so then I should talk nicely, I should talk softly, but there's an in-between realm, no? I can yell, no lashon hara, no? How does issur lashon hara yield דיבורו בנחת עם הבריות? So A, yesod number one, which lo telech rachil and Ramban could have mentioned and certainly has in mind because obviously the list is not intended to be exhaustive, the issur ona'as devarim. So we see that the Torah is misyaches to speech very seriously. We see that speech is a vehicle which can be hurtful or helpful. There's a reality to speech. We don't agree with the nursery rhyme, you know, sticks and stones will break my bones but names will never hurt me. The underlying sort of conception is not correct. In many contexts the Torah thinks speech is a reality. It's not just actions which are a reality, but speech is also a reality. So you certainly see that in the fact that there's an issur lashon hara, the fact that there's an issur ona'as devarim. Speech is a reality. A. B. What do you see from לא תקום ולא תטור? So l'chora in the Ramban, I think it's clear that he certainly understands לא תקום ולא תטור along the lines of the Rambam when the Rambam is talking about וכן כל הנוטר אחד מישראל עובר בלא תעשה. Skipping a few lines, Ella, what's the alternative to netira? When the Torah says lo sitor, so what that dictates is ימחה הדבר מלבו ולא יטרנה. No, I shouldn't hold this grudge. I shouldn't hold on to my resentment that you didn't let me borrow whatever it was.

זוהי הדעה הנכונה שאפשר שיתקיים בה ישוב הארץ ומשאם ומתנם של בני אדם זה עם זה.

So basically what issur netira says, I don't know, we would have thought why not? Why can't I hold on to it? Why isn't that a shuras hadin? And the Torah says that it's impossible to have any kind of functioning unit if that's the way we're going to be. You're certainly not going to have, you can't have society. You can't even really have a family if everyone holds on to every, even if it's legitimate grievance that he has. If a person holds on to every legitimate grievance, so no one's going to be on talking terms with anyone else, which in shul during Chazarat Hashatz and Krias Hatorah is not a bad situation actually, but other than that it is an intolerable situation. So you see in לא תקום ולא תטור, you see that people are supposed to be mevater to facilitate human relationships, whether it's on the broadest societal level or whether it's on the more intimate familial level. So mimmela, that's what the Ramban says. If a person again understands what the core of מצוות בין אדם לחברו is, a person even understands it should be בדיבור בנחת עם הבריות, that a person is supposed to get along with people, is supposed to have, and that even translates into דיבור בנחת עם הבריות. People don't like to be yelled at. People appreciate being dealt with with a soft touch. And what's remarkable here, you know, of the list the Ramban gives us of lo selech rachil,

אחרי שהזכיר מהם הרבה כגון לא תלך רכיל לא תקום ולא תטור ולא תעמוד על דם רעך לא תקלל חרש מפני שיבה תקום וכיוצא בהן חוזר לומר בדרך כלל שיעשה הטוב והישר.

So what's fascinating is that with the exception of mipnei seivah takum, the Ramban just lists only lavin, or lo sa'aseis, and clearly ve'asisah hayashar vehatov, as he then is illustrating in terms of bar metzra and דיבור בנחת עם הבריות, is certainly, you know, describing if not emphasizing what the kum va'asei is in the bein adam lachaveiro. So there is a carryover here, right, that it can be, it is the case, that the core or the crux of a mitzvas lo sa'asei helps us understand a... value, a yesod which will then also translate in terms of kum va'asei. In effect, לא תקם ולא תטר tells us to be vatranim. That's what it tells us to be vatranim. Really, lifnim mishuras hadin, you didn't lend me your car, there's no reason I should lend you my car. Lifnim mishuras hadin. And in effect, the emes is even within the לא תקם ולא תטר, it, right? There's, it's a mitzvas lo sa'asei, but the only way to avoid the mitzvas lo sa'asei is it forces an asei, right? The only way to avoid the lo sikom is that the person, he is mash'il kandomo. That's the only way to avoid the lo sa'asei. So within the lo sa'aseis are principles of kum va'asei behavior as well. Yeah, okay, maybe we'll stop here. Okay, so gut shabbos and...