I apologize for my Thursday no-show rabosai, but just wanted to see who would come lishmah for the Q&A without the without the pizza, without the doughnuts. Okay, so some of the some questions were pre-submitted. I'll begin with a couple of those, but they're not meant to preclude either follow-up or other questions that weren't that weren't submitted ahead of time. It wasn't intended to censor anyone's questions, but just to be able to have a little bit of momentum initially.

Maybe to begin with two totally different questions but relating more narrowly to shiur and then בלי נדר בעזרת השם move on to other things. One question relates to the the pace of shiur, the the way it was conveyed about learning iyun at such a fast pace. One of the developments or one of the practice, contemporary practices in yeshivas which has been decried, lamented, and bemoaned by numerous numerous gedolim is the tortuously slow pace at which at which learning happens. You know, you can meet someone and and this clearly is not singling out any particular yeshiva, unfortunately.

It's not, you know, it's not that, "Oh, that means yeshiva X." Unfortunately, that's not the case. You know, you can meet someone Hanukkah time at the beginning of Tevet and ask them where they're holding, and the answer can be daf daled or something when they began the zman learning Rif and beginning of the zman in Gemara, beginning of the zman on daf bet. You know, countless gedolim, you know, have and continue to bemoan that fact. For whatever reason, maybe it's important to know what the reasons are in order to be able to remove whatever obstacles exist, but for now let's not let's not look to identify any reasons.

But for whatever reasons, those calls, those wake-up calls, those pleas have fallen on deaf ears. And it's a major major problem. I think we're learning too slowly, I don't think we're learning too too quickly. I I feel I I feel remiss.

I feel having let you down and that we're not further. Not that we're not that we haven't been learning more slowly. It just doesn't the math of learning so slowly just doesn't add up. One needn't be an actuary and have passed multiple exams to to recognize that fact.

The math of learning so slowly doesn't add up. And what's more, there's only so much iyun we're capable of in any given sugya. So I don't think we're learning quickly. I think we're learning a little bit too slowly.

And I don't know, my brother sheyichye k'mo domo used to used to say that that a person has to train himself. to learn what what what he experiences as quickly. But maybe initially it seems quick, a person the same way, you know, a person can build up the stamina, the physical stamina and the focus to train himself to walk quickly and it doesn't mean that he's going to be tripping over himself, tripping over his own feet all the time. No, a person can develop the muscles, develop the leg muscles, develop the the have have the aerobic exercise and and the respiratory capacity to be able to walk quickly and then a person doesn't mean a person will trip, aderaba he'll just he'll get places, he'll cover he'll cover more ground.

So the same way the physical, the leg muscles and the lung capacity need to be need to be developed, the brain muscles need to be developed also. And wherever you turn, this lament is heard. You look in the Steipler, the Steipler has for instance in his letters, igros hadracha, kol hagedolim, peh echad, that we're all learning much too slowly and not covering enough ground. A very different question about shiur is the why we're wearing masks in shiur.

So as as we all know officially, as far as I know, I haven't heard that it's been rescinded officially, the last email I got that dealt with it, at least the last email that I saw that that dealt with it, reiterated that the university still has a mask policy in all buildings, in all common spaces. Now, bepoel obviously that isn't true. And it's one big sheker to say that there is a mandate. There's no such thing as a mandate which is not very very heavily encouraged and if necessary enforced.

Otherwise, it's not a mandate. Maybe it's a wish, maybe it's a chalom, maybe all of those but but it isn't it isn't a mandate. So it's a sheker. It's a sheker to say that there's that there's a mandate.

There isn't a mandate. Now I don't think that the talmidim are the ones who are purveying the sheker. They're neither the ones who have adopted or announced this policy. So it's not as if I think that anyone here is actively engaged in sheker by not complying with a so-called mandate because it isn't a mandate because it's not even encouraged, על אחת כמה וכמה enforced.

But lemaise, you know when we were learning the Tosafos about Shabbos, so we saw the distinction, you know you can have something which is what the gavra does in the mitzvah and then you can have the cheftza shel mitzvah. One's sensitivity to sheker should be, Dovid Hamelech says, sheker sonesi v'asoeva in תהלים קיט. Dovid Hamelech doesn't just say, you know, I tell the truth at all times, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. It's not only that I, Dovid Hamelech, will not speak sheker, I, Dovid Hamelech, won't engage in sheker.

No, I, Dovid Hamelech, detest and abhor sheker. That's what Dovid Hamelech says. So I don't know, and I I I raise the the question for your consideration. I don't know, a person walks into the building and there's the sign, I don't know, they still have the signs when you when you enter the building or not, I haven't noticed lately.

But a person walks into the building and there's the sign: mask mandate. And he's not wearing a mask. Is he guilty of sheker? No. But is he somehow or other part of a play and a facade of sheker? Yes, he is.

Is he guilty of sheker? No. Is he speaking sheker? Is he acting in a way that that is sheker? No. Is there some association with an institution institutional fraud and an institutional sheker. I don't know.

I don't know. I don't know. I don't think any individual Rebbe is entitled to suggest what happens anywhere other than in his own classroom, but in his own classroom, that is the individual Rebbe's responsibility. So as a Shiur, I don't think we should...

we should not only avoid propagating sheker, we should avoid having any association with it even if we're not the ones who are responsible for the sheker. Why should a person be associated with sheker? Nothing to do with whatever the medical and public health merits are or are not. Just on purely... on these, on these, on these other grounds.

Again, at any point if people questions, comments, people should not hesitate. There's one of the questions that was submitted: If one feels more connected to a different community, should they strongly reconsider or should they go with their heart? Is the YU hashkafa undeniable emes and therefore correct for everyone, or can one belong to a different community and grow more elsewhere? So as is often the case with good questions that can't be answered with one word, the answer is not yes, the answer is not no, and there are distinctions that need to be drawn. There are certainly elements of the YU hashkafa where there are very legitimate and valid alternatives. There are elements of the YU hashkafa which taka are emes and one should not be abandoning them for the sociological alternatives which are not really Torah alternatives.

So maybe we'll begin by talking about some of the things which fall into that second class, that second category. One pillar of Torah, of Torah living, that we try to transmit in the Yeshiva is that Torah demands balance. It demands balance in so many different pivotal areas. It demands balance, it demands integrating different elements, different components.

So for instance, Bitochon and Hishtadlus, person has to know how how the two are integrated and what's an authentic integration and balance between Bitochon and Hishtadlus and what isn't. Bitochon doesn't, Bitochon never relieves a person of obligations that the Torah imposes upon the person. The Torah says V'nishmartem Meod L'nafshoseichem. The Torah says רק השמר לך ושמר נפשך מאד which the Rambam in הלכות רוצח ושמירת נפש and then the Mechaber after him in Shulchan Aruch quote as referring to avoiding danger, safeguarding life.

The Torah doesn't say have Bitochon. The Torah doesn't say ignore what doctors say, ignore ignore I'm not talking about now, I'm talking about the earlier in the pandemic more than now Torah doesn't say ignore doctors, the Torah doesn't say ignore public health protocols and have Bitochon. When you do that, all you do is arrange for more Levayas than would have otherwise happened. That's not Bitochon and it's not Torah.

That that's what what results and resulted from from that. Person has to know what the balance is between between Bitochon and Hishtadlus in the area of Pikuach Nefesh in the context of a pandemic, especially the first spring of the pandemic, spring 2020 in the in the tri-state area. There's nothing what which is particularistic about YU or YU Hashkafa in trying to teach and transmit that type of balance. There's certainly a a range of opinions of what - and there already was in the Rishonim - what one's attitude towards Chochma is.

And there there are legitimate different Drachim and Mahalachim. It isn't, it isn't a legitimate Derech in Torah to have such indiscriminate total Bittul for the outside world that one can ignore medical consensus. It threatens lives and it makes a Chillul Hashem. There's no eival v'eival in in that type of of imbalance.

So there has to be a balance between obviously there's so much in the outside world which is so wrong and so crazy, literally crazy, literally crazy. Society back in the 1960s began denying the reality of traditional values, of moral law. And now society just denies facts. Everyone makes up their own facts.

People don't have genders anymore. It's insane. It's not just wrong. It's literally crazy.

Should one in an unfiltered sense be open to the outside world? Of course not. Of course not. Is רובא דרובא דרובא דרובא just so mekulkal? Of course it is. But אף על פי כן, a person can't be indiscriminate.

If the bitul becomes such that when one acts contrary to halacha and ignores, again talking about the early stages of COVID, and ignores medical consensus even if it's true that 99%, 99.9% needs to be rejected, it's a dangerous imbalance to inflate 99.9% into a hundred percent. That's not a YU hashkafa. That's Torah and the alternative is not Torah. It's nothing to do with YU.

It has something to do with YU in the sense that we try to teach and transmit that, but there's nothing particularistic about that. There's a stress on honesty, on yosher, which is Torah. It's not any particular version of Torah. It's not a particular derech within Torah.

It's Torah. To posture to secular authorities that a school or a camp is masking because you have kids put on masks when there's an investigation and they don't wear masks the rest of the time, it's not a particular version of Torah. It's not a particular shita within Torah. Torah says that a person has to be straight, has to be yosher, has to be honest.

A person has to be straight. A person can't dray and look to deceive and that's not Torah. It's not a question of hashkafa A versus hashkafa B. So there certainly is a range of drachim and there are certainly things that a person will see here which are correct which is not to say we don't have our problems and we don't have our chesronos.

We obviously do. We have our problems, we have our chesronos, we have our inconsistencies. That's all obviously painfully very true. But in terms of what's right, a person needs to distinguish between what's right which is Torah and there is no alternative even if one doesn't always find it universally, as opposed to what's right where there's a machlokes on it.

And a person needs to, in terms of this question, a person needs to distinguish. And when it's clear what the emes is, it's not. I think that there's a famous maise with Rav Yonason Eibeschütz that I guess it was a priest, I don't remember who the one who asked him, but it said it says in the Torah achray rabim lehatos. So the adherents of our religion far outnumber the adherents of your religion, so achray rabim lehatos.

So the Rebbe Yonason answered, he said achray rabim lehatos is when something is mutar besafek, so then you follow the rov. When there's no safek, there's no achray rabim lehatos. Certain things which are emes, it doesn't make a difference how popular that emes may be at any given point, it doesn't matter where one does or doesn't find that emes, if it's emes, it's emes. And there's nothing that is a counterforce to that.

I guess the Oberishter should feel free to considering that it is emes, so then what does it say about other communities or individuals that did not end up seeing this as emes? It requires a no-holds-barred cheshbon hanefesh and it also has implications as to whom one can look for for psak and hadracha in many areas. It does have implications. It's not something that didn't happen and it's not something that didn't make us aware of very painful realities. No, there's no triumphalism associated with that statement.

That statement, there's only pain that's associated with that statement. But that is the reality. It's not something that should be forgotten. It's not just that Baruch Hashem we have vaccines and halevai that we have turned the corner here and there aren't going to be any developments which there are issues which need to be recognized and contended with and there are implications, there are definitely implications.

Rabbi, maybe say some of the bigger issues that are into the eileh v'eileh cheshbon and how to make that cheshbon if we should go achray rabim on those issues? It's not technically achray rabim. Technically achray rabim is when you have a body such as the Sanhedrin that is omaid leminyan. That's what achray rabim is. But it's not technically achray rabim to sort of let's say, I mean this comment has been made, if a person makes an intergenerational study and comes up with, well, seven Rishonim say like this, four Rishonim say like that, technically achray rabim lehatos doesn't apply here.

Okay, one may or may not non-technically look to that, but it's not automatic because technically achray rabim is when it's within a body such as the Sanhedrin which is omaid leminyan. So since it's not technically achray rabim, it's also not automatically achray rabim either way. There were lots of, let's say, issues in chinuch where there are legitimate differences of opinion. We mentioned one: what what should the attitude towards chochma be? And and and there's legitimate differences of of opinion there.

And yitachen that, you know, not only should that should those legitimate differences of opinion as it were be tolerated, but it's enriching that those differences of opinion. When the differences are legitimate, so again, it's not just something that we sort of begrudgingly acknowledge, but it's something that is is enriching. I don't know that there's the same way there's no there isn't necessarily one institution which is the best yeshiva for everyone to to learn in. Lav davka that there's one particular derech which is which is the best derech for everyone.

Post the Chofetz Chaim, the famous Chofetz Chaim on Likkutei Halachos in Sotah, דף כה עמוד ב. There obviously isn't a a consensus as exactly how to translate that. So there's different... okay, so some...

that's not to say that... the fact that there are legitimate differences means that every view that's espoused is automatically legitimate; that certainly isn't the case. But there are there are legitimate differences and legitimate differences in in approach. So there are, especially in inyanei chinuch, there are many such many such things.

Another, sort of shifting gears majorly, one of the questions here is, what's an appropriate question to ask during shiur? So that in fact is an appropriate question to ask. There's so I think there are two considerations to have. The first one is is easy to assess, relatively speaking, or easier to to assess. The second one is is probably more more challenging, more difficult to assess.

First one is that a question which which one asks during shiur, one's sense should be that it's of interest and relevance and importance to the ulam, not not just to to oneself. The other question is, the second consideration is that asking questions is is a very very important integral... part of learning but it shouldn't substitute for the yegia v'amala of thinking through what was said. And sometimes, and again this is obviously not so easy to assess and the judgment call isn't always so easy to make, but sometimes what's needed is to chazar the shiur, look up the marei mekomos, try to think through at one's own pace what was said, and to ask a question and have it repeated in lieu of doing that, one shortchanges oneself.

Because the growth in learning happens from being challenged to think and rethink and walk it through, walk through the mahalach for oneself, not just very sort of passively receive it. And if the question is one that wouldn't be necessary if the person would first chazor and then look up, maybe I hadn't seen the Ramban that we were discussing beforehand, or if I had seen it maybe I hadn't noticed the diyuk, or maybe I hadn't thought about this mahalach, maybe I just need to think through what the question was, what the ra'aya was, so to ask that question shortchanges oneself. Because it means that the growth in learning comes from, again, not just passively receiving, but from then sort of actively rethinking and reconstructing and reenacting the mahalach. And questions asked prematurely can abort that process, and then one is shortchanged.

So that is a very, very weighty consideration in terms of whether to ask a question or not. And then you should never ask a question if I'm not going to know the answer; I mean, that's a comfortable place. I'm kidding, so that wasn't that serious now, okay. Any - how important, if at all, is interfaith dialogue, especially after the recent Abraham Accords? So I'm obviously aware of the Abraham Accords.

I'm not aware of what's going on in terms of interfaith dialogue after that, so I can't relate to that specifically. In general, the Rav's seforim are treasures that we should try to take full advantage of. One of those treasures is his essay, Confrontation, where he talks about the question of interfaith dialogue and the short. Summation of his position is no.

People, a lot of, a lot of. People like to ask certain questions about confrontation. Well, how is it that the Rav's essay Lonely Man of Faith, which was originally an oral presentation, was made in front of a non-Jewish audience? So that is factually accurate, that that is true. It has zero bearing on the essay Confrontation, because what interfaith dialogue means, the either explicitly stated or implicitly albeit unstated premise of dialogue is that through dialogue on religious matters, so then we'll learn to overcome, we'll learn to sort of find common ground.

Sort of the same way that there should be, the Torah is emes, Yiddishkeit is emes, and there's no need and no justification for making the Torah, Toras emes, Toras Hashem, a one voice of many in terms of talking about what is or isn't true, what is or isn't correct. When the Rav gave that drasha, which later was written up as Lonely Man of Faith, he wasn't dialoguing with anyone. He wasn't saying, you tell me what your conception of faith is and I'll tell you what my conception of faith is and then you give in to me on this and I'll give in to you on that, and you recognize the church for whatever it is and then maybe we'll consider stopping to launch pogroms as we've been doing for the past two millennia, that will be the quid pro quo. Dialogue means quid pro quo.

It means splitting differences. There's no room for interfaith dialogue. Are there elements of Torah and Toras emes which are universal and which someone can share meaningfully and appropriately with a non-Jew? Yes, non-Jews are supposed to have emunah. They're supposed to have faith.

They're supposed to know what it means to have faith. That's not interfaith dialogue. That's teaching universal elements of truth. So did the Rav do that? He absolutely did that.

But when it came to interfaith dialogue, he understood that interfaith dialogue is based on a very different premise. It's based on again, dialogue means you engage in dialogue to learn how to get along with each other and you split differences. Torah doesn't negotiate with any other, lehavdil, lehavdil, lehavdil system of belief. So interfaith dialogue is not a good thing.

It's not a good thing. The Abraham Accords in terms of just the recognition of Medinas Yisrael, that there shouldn't be a state of war, that there should be a political understanding and that there should be political dialogue and there should be political and economic cooperation are all very big positives. But not interfaith dialogue. And if you read Confrontation carefully, he says it between the lines.

He says it between the lines. He actually says it in the lines if you read it. He says the community of the many, let us not deceive ourselves, the community of the many, that refers to the Catholic Church, the community of the many will not be satisfied with any halfway measures from the community of the few. Interfaith dialogue was a way to shmad Jews.

That's what the point of interfaith dialogue was. It was a way to shmad Jews and he saw it for what it was. How does Rebbi Soloveitchik's shiur differ from that of the Rav? And why is Rebbi able to give a shiur differently if at all? I apologize, but I can't even respond. There's no, I can't mention them in the same breath even to explain what the differences are.

They're not, they're not in the same universe. Is it moral or correct for some Jews to subtly try to be mekarev people who we think are not as affiliated, if we're not willing to, we don't want anyone to try to be mekarev us to their way? In the workplace or with neighbors, things like that, that are unaffiliated? Sure it is. If let's leave religion aside. If you don't smoke and you have a coworker who does smoke, so it's a medically established fact how dangerous smoking is.

So it's totally appropriate that you should want to be mashpia on them, but you shouldn't want him to be mashpia on you. If you're right and he's wrong, so then it should be a one-way street. You're looking to be mashpia on him, but not that he should be mashpia on you. Sometimes in life, yes, there are lots of things in life which are gray, but there's also lots of things in life which are black and white.

And when we're dealing with black and white and we believe in absolute truth. Not every disagreement you have with your chavrusa is a question of absolute truth on one side or the other. But of course there's absolute truth. And in many things in life you're right and the other person is wrong.

And when that is the case, so then yes, you want to be mashpia on him letovato. It's not a power grab, it's not a power play. You want to be mashpia on him, but you don't want him to be mashpia on you. It's 100% appropriate.

In different sects of Jews I guess there's some areas where they rely on their rebbeim as da'as Torah much more and other areas where just discuss things with rebbeim to a lesser extent. What does Rebbi think is the right amount or what topics should specifically, what's the line for when you should be discussing with a rebbe as opposed to when you should be deciding for ourselves and other things? So let's maybe initially talk about if the question is something which is a shaila in halacha, not a question where a person's looking for hadracha. You know, is this the right young lady for the yeshiva bachur to be marrying is not a purely halachic shaila, but it requires hadracha. So let's leave that aside for a moment and talk about things which really are questions where ultimately the answer is muttar, assur, chiyuv, not chiyuv, etc. A person needs to be aware and hopefully the rav to whom he goes is even more aware and hasn't been misled by anyone, needs to be aware of what elements are relevant other than the mastery of Shulchan Aruch.

There's a letter from Rav Chaim Ozer where Rav Chaim Ozer said how was it that in 19th-century Germany there was a major dispute between Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch and the Wurtzburger Rav, Rav Bamberger. as to whether or not the Orthodox should break off and form their own Kehilla or whether they should remain a part of the general Kehilla. So Chaim Ozer writes they were both very very great individuals but they weren't mammash the two greatest gedolim of their day. They were both very very great, both mishichmo vamala, but they weren't mammash the two greatest.

So how is it that they didn't send the shaila? Like why is it that each one sort of followed his understanding? Why didn't they? Why didn't they? Each one was aware of the other, why didn't they submit the shaila to to someone whom they both would have agreed upon and and there certainly were such individuals you know who towered even above them. So Chaim Ozer writes because some shailos you have to have a first hand grasp of the metzius in order to have to be able to give an answer. It's not something which is an explicit case in Shulchan Aruch, it's a question of applying Shulchan Aruch to a metzius. When the question is not just a machat b'kurkavan, which is what the case itself is in Shulchan Aruch, but it's a question of applying Shulchan Aruch, so then so much of what the answer hinges on is how you understand and grasp and analyze the metzius.

And by definition you can't provide that to someone else because you're just providing what you see. So anyone to whom Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch would have presented the question would have obviously you know been likely to agree with Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, not because he wouldn't have been totally honest and ehrlich about it, but just because that's how he grasped and understood and analyzed the metzius and the pros and cons etc. That's what Chaim Ozer said they didn't send the shaila because they couldn't send the shaila because you have to be there in Germany in the trenches to have an opinion. The metzius in Eastern Europe was different than the metzius was in in Western Europe. They couldn't, they couldn't export that shaila to the gedolim of of Eastern Europe.

So a person has to know in asking a shaila is is this a question of applying a Shulchan Aruch, a Gemara to a metzius which isn't in the Shulchan Aruch, which isn't in the Gemara and so much of what the ultimate psak is depends upon understanding that metzius, knowing what to see in the metzius, what to accentuate, what not to mention. And and a person has to go to to the right address. Then related to that, sometimes in in some shailos there there's an expertise outside of Torah that's needed to answer the shaila also. To go to a rav and ask should I or should I not get vaccinated, a person has to know what that rav's sources of medical information are in terms of vaccines and the question of of vaccination.

Because the rav can be adam gadol me'od, but but if he doesn't have, if he's not being given the the accurate medical expertise, so then he he's not going to be able to give you the the right psak also. So a person can't ask too much from the rav. Da'as Torah doesn't mean that rabbanim are omniscient. They're not omniscient.

Ribono shel Olam's omniscient. Human beings are not omniscient. Ribono shel Olam's infallible, human beings are not infallible. There's no such thing as because someone is an adam gadol me'od it doesn't make him omniscient, it doesn't make him infallible.

And if we ask shailos that shouldn't be going to a certain address, so we distort the shaila as though I'm telling you everything you need to know to answer the shaila. So then the onus is on us if if the answer forthcoming isn't the right one. So a person has to know what type of shaila it is and and is it a shaila that is it a shaila not every shaila can be sent from America to Eretz Yisrael. Not talking about Covid, not talking about etc., etc. Not every shaila can be can be sent from America to Eretz Yisrael.

The same way that Chaim Ozer explained that they couldn't send the shaila from Germany to to Eastern Europe. Other shailos can be sent from from America to Eretz Yisrael. A person has to know what the what the type of shaila it is. You can't have a rav going back even pre-Covid times now you can't have a rav who doesn't have medical credentials and by credentials I don't mean a diploma.

I mean the yedios who has his own shitta about medical matters. There's no such thing. He can't have a shitta that again pre-Covid, pre-Covid times don't vaccinate because of such and such if he doesn't have the medical credentials. And again I'm not talking about diplomas.

I'm talking about the the knowledge the the firsthand personal expertise. He can't have his own opinion on that. And there's no daas Torah there. There's no daas Torah.

So a person has to know what what type of question he's dealing with and then he knows what the what the address is. Then what when a person moves away from from what's pure psak halacha ultimately, ultimately all these medical shailos they are pure psak halacha. The point is that there's expertise that's needed before the psak halacha can happen. Ultimately what they were doing in Germany was a question of psak halacha.

But but there was a grasp of the metzius that was needed in order to to pasken. Other areas again where it's a question of an eitza should I go into this profession, should I go into that profession, should I marry her, shouldn't I marry her? Other things which are not psak halacha. It's appropriate to seek hadracha. It's appropriate to seek hadracha when when things are not clear.

Generally we we assume that the rabbanim have a certain clarity of thought, a certain depth, a certain perception which can be helpful. But even there it's a question of of being enriched by that depth, by that perception, by that clarity, ultimately for the person to make his own decision. And if a person has to decide whether to you know does he marry her, doesn't he marry her is not something that the rav is going to tell him. I think the rav can help him, give him context and perspective and vantage point on his sfeikos, on on what the various issues are, what the various considerations are.

But those decisions a person ultimately makes for himself. Is it possible that there's so many people who would consider an adam gadol in terms of Torah but they have incredibly skewed sources of metzius? If they're really an adam gadol shouldn't they realize like what an accurate source of metzius is? Sometimes if a question is not presented properly the onus and the fault is on the shoel, not on the person answering the question. A lot of that happens unfortunately. A lot of that happens.

What other cheshbonos should go into besides financial should go into when a person decides to start dating or get married and and those different things when it's it's. So in theory, so we should all be married by age 20. In practice, in many, many circles, I was included, we don't do that. But there needs to be a reason why we're not doing it.

It's not that the Gemara is being rewritten rachmana litzlan. There needs to be a reason why we're not doing it. There are many legitimate reasons why we're not doing it, but a person has to weigh whether or not those any of those reasons is applicable. A person can not be ready to date and get married.

A person in terms of one's maturation, probably due to societal influence rather than any kind of nishtanu hateva'im, we mature at a later age than the earlier doros did. There's a level of maturity that's necessary to have the responsibility of being married. A person has to have a sense of religious identity and direction in order to get married. A husband and wife need to be on the same page.

They don't have to be on the same line on the page, but they need to be on the same page in terms of religious direction in life, in terms of religious identity. Sometimes a person is still figuring that out, sometimes a person is still searching, sometimes a person it's still he doesn't yet have enough of that identity, enough of that sense of that direction. Doesn't mean that a person feels like he's perfected himself. A person never feels that way, otherwise we would not get married.

But there's a difference between feeling that a person has perfected himself, feeling that he's reached the destination as opposed to feeling that he has a sense of direction in terms of where he's going and what his values are and what the lifestyle is that he's looking to live. So that core identity needs to be achieved also before a person can get married. If getting married earlier means that there's going to be if getting married at age 20 means that the reichayim al tzavaro, the responsibility for parnassa is something that will therefore come earlier and the person wants to postpone a couple of years so that he'll be able to learn more, so that's also, as long as the person is not beset by hirhurim, that's also a legitimate reason to be postponing, not postponing until he puts himself at a disadvantage in finding a shidduch, but it's certainly legitimate for a certain period. But if the person is emotionally ready, religiously ready, it won't have implications in terms of ol haparnassa being something he has to assume at a younger age accordingly, so it's not really a question of having to postpone in order to allow for more Torah growth, so then a person should be getting married younger.

But often, you know, one of these other considerations is very relevant. Is very relevant. Okay, I think we have to have to stop for Mincha. Thank you.