Transcript

ואלה המשפטים אשר תשים לפניהם. ואלה המשפטים אשר תשים לפניהם. כי רצה להקדים להם המשפטים.

So it will become clear from the hemshech of the Ramban that that mishpatim meaning the mishpatim of Parshas Mishpatim, Hakadosh Baruch Hu wanted to prioritize. He wanted to give a din kadimah to presenting again mishpatim in the sense of the mishpatim that we find here in Parshas Mishpatim. Why is that?

כי כאשר היה בעשרת הדברות הדבור הראשון בידיעת השם והשני באיסור עבודה זרה חזר וצוה את משה

at the end of Parshas Yisro

כה תאמר אל בני ישראל אתם ראיתם כי מן השמים דברתי עמכם שתזהירם אתה עוד שיתנו לבם למה שראו ויזהרו במצות האלו שצויתם. כי אתם ראיתם כנגד דבור אנכי ולא תעשון אתי כנגד לא יהיה לך.

L’hashlim, to supplement to inyan avodah zarah.

ואלה המשפטים כנגד לא תחמד כי אם לא ידע האדם משפט הבית או השדה ושאר הממון יחשוב שהוא שלו ויחמדהו ויקחהו לעצמו.

So the reason, this is the sort of the end of the explanation for the statement of כי רצה להקדים להם המשפטים because in the immediate aftermath of the Aseret Hadibrot, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu is looking to reinforce and facilitate our compliance with Aseret Hadibrot. One can't comply with Lo Sachmod if one doesn't know where the line is between what belongs to one, what one is entitled to take, and what belongs to re’eihu and is therefore subject to the lav of Lo Sachmod. In this sense it's somewhat of a similar you find I think the Chofetz Chaim writes, the Chofetz Chaim wrote two companion volumes, two companion works: Chofetz Chaim and Shmiras Halashon. So Chofetz Chaim has the halakhos of lashon hara u’rechilus and Shmiras Halashon is a likut, is an anthology of the ma’amarei Chazal about the chomer ha’aveirot of lashon hara u’rechilus. And the Chofetz Chaim explains, he says the ma’amarei Chazal impress upon the person the need to be nizar and they impress upon the person the chomer ha’issurim. But a person can be thereby motivated to be nizar, but if he doesn't know the dinim, he's not going to be able to translate that inspiration. A person can be inspired to Shmiras Halashon, but he has to know tachlis, what's included in isur lashon hara, what does it mean to be nizar in Shmiras Halashon? Chazon Ish writes the same thing in his little kuntres on inyanei emunah bitachon how mussar which again inspires, sort of helps a person. arrive at convictions, but it then needs to be accompanied just by limud halacha to know what does it mean to be a yerei chet? How does one translate that? How does one implement that? So this is basically that type of idea that the Ramban is saying. Here it's not the Mussar, it's not the Divrei Aggada, but here it's that the lav of Lo Sachmod, a person can be willing and wanting to be nizar, but he has to know tachlis what the dinim in Choshen Mishpat to know what is his and what isn't.

לפיכך אמר תשים לפניהם משפטים ישרים ינהיגו אותם ביניהם ולא יחמדו מה שאינו שלהם מן הדין וכן אמרו במדרש רבה כל התורה כולה תלויה במשפט וכן נתן הקדוש ברוך הוא דינים אחר עשרת הדברות.

The Ramban is soon going to quote the Drashos Chazal on Lifneihem, but he says that the עיקר פשוטו של מקרא, he explains what the room is for the Drashos Chazal, but the עיקר פשוטו של מקרא here is that you should enact amongst them ואלה המשפטים אשר תשים לפניהם. The עיקר פשוטו של מקרא is that the Lifneihem is not referring, certainly not referring exclusively to Dayanim. It's referring to Bnei Yisrael. So ואלה המשפטים אשר תשים לפניהם, this is what you should present to them in the sense of this is what you should enact amongst them.

לפיכך אמר תשים לפניהם משפטים ישרים ינהיגו אותם ביניהם ולא יחמדו מה שאינו שלהם מן הדין וכן אמרו במדרש רבה כל התורה כולה תלויה במשפט וכן נתן הקדוש ברוך הוא דינים אחר עשרת הדברות.

So the question is when the Ramban says וכן אמרו במדרש רבה, so וכן אמרו במדרש רבה sounds like it's an idea that the Ramban has already expressed and now he's citing that you find this in Chazal. So where did the Ramban say this? In what we just read, the Ramban said that something to the effect of כל התורה כולה תלויה במשפט? So maybe what, I'm not sure, you have to look in the Midrash and see if this is tenable in context. But maybe what the Ramban means is, again, this idea that we just spoke about, that

אם לא ידע האדם משפט הבית, כל התורה כולה תלויה במשפט

doesn't mean dinim mammonos. It means mishpat in terms of pirtei halacha. Pirtei halacha, right? The mishpatim basically in this context, ואלה המשפטים אשר תשים לפניהם, mishpatim means these are the halachos, these are the specifics, these are the specific halachos of the general issurim presented in Aseres Hadibros. In Aseres Hadibros it said Lo Sachmod, so here, for instance, so here, here are the mishpatim, mishpatim in the sense of pirtei halachos of that issur. So in that sense and why? Because absent these mishpatim, absent the pirtei halacha, so a person can cherish the beauty of Shabbos and be so inspired by kedusha Shabbos, lemaise, to observe Shabbos, a person needs to know the pirtei halachos of Hilchos Shabbos. Otherwise, so in that sense, and so clearly what the Ramban said, even though he didn't spoon-feed it, is clearly something which has implications for kol hatorah kullah, right? The same way a person can't observe and implement Lo Sachmod without knowing the pirtei halacha of dinim mammonos, what is mine and therefore I have a right to be chomed, and I'm not being chomed beis rei'eihu, it's mine. or what isn't mine? So the same thing is true for every din, every din. A person is dedicated to Kashrus. Okay, and the maisa is, what does that mean? How do I implement that? So that's the

וכן אמרו במדרש רבה כל התורה כולה תלויה במשפט. וכן נתן הקדוש ברוך הוא דינים

again. That's what mishpatim means in this context, the dinim, pirtei halachos acharei aseres hadibros. וכן יפורש באלה המשפטים hamishpat ba'avodah zarah, further dinim of avodah zarah, u'vikibbud av, further dinim of kibbud av והרציחה והניאוף הנזכרים בעשרת הדברות. Now Chazal darshan ודרשו לפניהם ולא לפני גוים. So what room is there for the drashas Chazal when clearly the peshuto shel mikra is lifneihem means Bnei Yisroel? It doesn't refer to dayanim and again tasim lifneihem means to enact amongst them. So the Ramban says מפני שהיה ראוי לומר אשר תשים להם. If all the Torah had in mind was the what until now the Ramban presents as the peshuto shel mikra, so then it should have been asher tasim lohem, k'mo, the idiom that you find כמו שאמר שם שם לו חוק ומשפט. Som lo is the idiom. V'amar lifneihem that the Torah therefore additionally is saying sheheim yihiyu hadayanim. כי על השופט יעבור הלשון הזה. That figure of speech of lifnei is one which is associated with dayanim. ואמרו ונגשו אשר להם הריב לפני השם, lifnei hakohanim vehashoftim,

עד עמדו לפני העדה למשפט, למשפט לפני כל יודעי דת ודין.

V'darshu od, so one drash on lifneihem is לפניהם ולא לפני גוים, the issur arkkaos. It's assur to go to outside of Beis Din, outside of Beis Din. It doesn't necessarily mean, I mean it says goyim, but what it really means is outside of Beis Din, not to a non-Torah system. The poskim I think are unanimous that secular courts in Israel also have a din of arkkaos because it's not what they're paskening is not din Torah.

ודרשו עוד לפניהם ולא לפני הדיוטות מפני שכתוב במשפטים והגישו אדוניו אל האלהים. עד האלהים יבא דבר שניהם. וכתב גם כן ונתן בפלילים שהם הדיינים המומחים הסמוכים על משה רבינו.

Tosfos in the beginning of Sanhedrin on beis amud beis also says this, that the drashah of ואלה המשפטים אשר תשים לפניהם, the way lifneihem implies mumchim and not hedyotos is because the lifneihem, before them. So who are the them? So the pronoun of them is to be understood in light of what we find subsequently והגישו אדוניו אל האלהים or עד האלהים יבא דבר שניהם where Elohim has the connotation of mumcheh. The Ramban doesn't, I mean that Chazal already tell us in again in the beginning of Sanhedrin amongst other places that the mashma'os, the connotation of Elohim as it refers to a dayan, it means a dayan mumcheh as again as the Ramban reminds us of the definition that it means that that the dayanim have received the original smicha which was an unbroken chain which went back to Moshe Rabbeinu. Rambam says that that chain of smicha continued until the end of the times of the Chachmei HaGemara down to the days of Abaye and Rava. That's when that original chain of smicha was broken. But how is it that Elohim has Elohim as a dayan seems to seems to be rooted in the fact that El means koach and therefore it's used also obviously Elokim is lashon kodesh but there's also elohim lashon chol for someone who who exercises koach who's a ba'al s'rara. V'inasicha elohim l'paroh. Right, you're gonna control Paroh. You're gonna you're gonna be dictating to Paroh. Paroh's not gonna be dictating to you. V'inasicha elohim l'paroh. So that's how as a lashon chol elohim means dayan but why does it necessarily have the mashma'us of of a dayan mumcha? The same question of v'nasan bi'plilim. So v'nasan bi'plilim so Onkelos says on that phrase v'yitein b'meimar dayanaya. That's what Rashi says when Yaakov Avinu says to to Yosef v'ofanecha lo pilalti, I didn't judge that that it was ever that it would ever be possible that I would see you again. V'ofanecha lo pilalti. The the shoresh peh lamed lamed means means din.

ולכך אמר וכאן שהמשפטים האלה ישים אותם לפני אלהים שיזכיר.

Again, lifneihem to be understood in light of the pronoun of lifneihem before them in light of the elohim that's mentioned subsequently.

ולא לפני גוים ולא לפני מי שאינו שופט על פי התורה והוא הדיוט לזה שאסור לבוא לפניו כשם שאסור לבוא לפני הגוים.

And af al pi and the issur arkaos or the issur hedyotos is אף על פי שיודע שדיניהם of the arkaos shel goyim is kidineinu or שההדיוט הזה יודע את הדין. Even if if one knows that in this specific instance the arkaos pasken the same thing as din torah or the hedyot knows or would be mechaven to the din torah or שההדיוט הזה יודע את הדין וידון כהוגן. But hu, the ba'al din who wants to bring the other the other his friend to the din torah, asur lasumo dayan. He can't appoint the hedyot a dayan

ולצעוק לו שיכוף את בעל דינו לדון לפניו וההדיוט עצמו אסור לדון להם.

So the Ramban says there's two elements to the issur hedyotos. It's an issur for a ba'al din to look to the hedyot to act in the capacity of a dayan and it's an issur on the hedyot himself to to act that way. ואף על פי שהזכירו חכמים שתי הכתות האלה כאחת, even though Chazal mentioned the two together in the sense that both issurin are contained in the lifneihem, there's a crucial crucial difference between them. Yeish hefresh beineihem.

שרצו שני בעלי הדין לבוא לפני ההדיוט שבישראל מותר הוא ובדקבלו עליהו דינו דין. אבל לפני הגוים אסור הם לבוא לפניו שידונו להם בדיניהם לעולם ואפילו היו דיניהם כדינינו באותו עניין.

There's a din the mishna says in Sanhedrin in the third perek that if the two ba'alei d'vavim agree between themselves that נאמן עלי אבא ואביך or נאמנים עלי שלושה רועי בקר that they can accept between themselves that we're gonna go be dan before someone who's pasul ladun. So let's say a karov is pasul ladun, so the two ba'alei d'vavim can say, no, we agree that... We agree that we're going to be dan before the father of one of the two ba'alei dinam or for that matter ro'eh bakar, shepherds who are hedyotos. The hedyot can't act as a when you have a beisdin, so beisdin has the right to send someone hazmana ledin and tell the person that he's mechuyav to come be dan. So that a hedyot cannot do. A hedyot can't act in that capacity. One ba'al dover trying to be force another ba'al dover to come to beisdin can't turn to a hedyot to act in that capacity. But if the two ba'alei devarim agree between themselves that they're going to go to a hedyot or hedyotos to resolve their dispute, so they're allowed to do that. But they're not allowed to do that with arka'os, even if the two sides agree let's go to arka'os, that remains, that remains assur. Rashi comments why about the chomer of issur arka'os. Rashi says on

לפניכם ולא לפני עובדי אלילים. ואפילו ידעת בדין אחד שהם דנים אותו כדיני ישראל אל תביאהו בערכאות שלהם שהמביא דיני ישראל לפני ארמים

m'chalel - lav davka aramim, just aramim is often used just as meaning Gentile. Doesn't mean specifically Aramean.

מחלל את השם ומיקר שם עובדי אלילים להחשיבם שנאמר כי לא כצורנו צורם ואויבינו פלילים.

keshe'oyveinu pelilim, when our enemies are our judges, זהו עדות לעלוי יראתם. So to be dan in arka'os is a chillul Hashem and it lends prestige to avodah zarah. Why is that? A person goes to a goyishe court, so what's it got to do with being a chillul Hashem and what's it got to do with lending prestige to avodah zarah? So if you take a look at the Ramban here in pasuk vov on והגישו אדוניו אל האלהים. This is talking about the eved ivri being nirtza is the context of the pasuk. So the Torah says והגישו אדוניו אל האלהים. The beisdin, צריך שימלך במוחו שמחבבו לו, right? Quoting Rashi. So Elohim here means beisdin. ve'amar Ibn Ezra, so why do we find Elohim b'lashon chol meaning beisdin? So the Ibn Ezra says

כי נקראו השופטים אלהים בעבור שהם מקיימי משפטי האלהים בארץ. ולדעתי יאמר הכתוב והגישו אדוניו אל האלהים עד האלהים יבא דבר שניהם לומר כי האלהים יהיה עמהם בדבר משפט.

It's as if the word is simultaneously kodesh v'chol. The nigla dikra layer of meaning is that it's chol. As in עד אלהים יבא דבר שניהם. The remez is עד האלהים יבא דבר שניהם. That Hakadosh Baruch Hu is present in beisdin. הוא יצדיק והוא ירשיע. vezehu she'amar and that's the same double entendre says the Ramban asher yarshi'un. Again, the nigla dikra is elohim, is lashon beisdin, is chol.

וכך אמר משה כי המשפט לאלהים הוא. וכך אמר יהושפט כי לא לאדם תשפטו כי להשם ועמכם בדבר משפט.

There's a very beautiful, beautiful idea here which the Ramban is just showing recurs in many psukim. Fundamentally, we have no right to judge each other. Judging is the exclusive prerogative of God. On many levels, one person has no right to judge another person. To judge another person implies, but let's say in in court, in the United States, say you refer to the judge as as your honor. The judge is elevated. It's as if the judge is on a higher level than the the people who are being judged. So that doesn't really exist. One person isn't on a higher level than another person, is not ontologically on a on a higher level than than another person. There's no... it's not really true. One person can't judge another person. אל תדין את חברך עד שתגיע למקומו. A person needs to know every possible mitigating factor. I don't know, do we really? We're not omniscient. So כי המשפט לאלהים הוא. Basically, mishpat is the exclusive prerogative of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Ay, there is Beis Din? Yeah, there is Beis Din because we're not on a madreiga and this isn't the way Hakadosh Baruch Hu wanted the world, that every time there's a din Torah that there's going to be nevuah and that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is going to pasken. So Hakadosh Baruch Hu says, I'm going to provide what the halachos are and the Beis Din will be my representatives and by following the halachos, the hilchos dayanim, the hilchos eidus, hilchos toen venitan, so they'll give a proper psak. So basically Beis Din are not acting on their own, they're acting as representatives of Hakadosh Baruch Hu because a human being has no right to judge.

וכן אמר הכתוב אלהים נצב בעדת אל בקרב אלהים ישפט. כלומר בקרב עדת אלהים ישפט כי האלהים הוא השופט.

Hakadosh Baruch Hu is being shofet via the the instrument through His emissaries of the dayanim.

וכן אמר ועמדו שני האנשים אשר להם הריב לפני השם.

The chiyuv amida in Beis Din, the chiyuv amida that ba'alei dina have to stand in Beis Din, the chiyuv that eidim have when they give their eidus to stand in Beis Din, they're standing because of kovid haShechina. וזה טעם כי לא אצדיק רשע על הפירוש הנכון because Hakadosh Baruch Hu is really the one who's rendering the psak in Beis Din.

ובאלה שמות רבה ראיתי אלא בשעה הדיין יושב ודן באמת כביכול מניח הקדוש ברוך הוא שמי השמים ומשרה שכינתו בצדו שנאמר כי הקים השם להם שפטים והיה השם עם השופט.

So in light of this, when you rethink the Rashi asher tasim lifneichem that arka'os is a chillul Hashem, arka'os is m'yaker the elilim, so now you understand. Hayos the din, hayos the din is the exclusive prerogative of Hakadosh Baruch Hu and the whole system of Beis Din is that the Beis Din are the appointed dayanim, the appointed representatives of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So if a person goes to the goiyishe court, so then that implies that they're the representatives of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. They with their avodah zarah-dig beliefs or they with their atheistic kfirah-dig beliefs, they're the representative. So that takeh chillul Hashem, takeh m'yaker shem elilim l'hachshivun. The shaila is like this. We know the din is and it's the practice also. What happens bazman hazeh that we don't really have, the Beis Din is not in a position to exercise kfiah when they would need to? So what happens... What happens if you have one tzad in a dispute refuses to come to beis din? Refuses to come to beis din. Again, a ba'al davar always has the option, if a beis din sends him a hazmanah l'din, so he can always say he wants zabla. זה בורר לו אחד וזה בורר לו אחד. He can always respond to the hazmanah and say, I'm willing to be dan a din torah, but I'm not mechuyav to come to your beis din, but it should be zabla. I'll choose one dayan, let the other tzad choose one dayan, those two dayanim will choose the third dayan, and it'll be zabla. But let's say he's not doing that, it's not that he's exercising his right to zabla. No, he's just a mesarev l'din. He refuses to acknowledge, to respond to the hazmanah l'din. So what happens? Beis din sends him a hazmanah once, twice, three times, and then if he's a mesarev l'din, so then beis din gives a hetter to the other ba'al davar to take him to arka'os. Arka'os can enforce it. Arka'os can- they have a koach hakfiah in society. And then it's totally muttar for the ba'al davar to press his claims in arka'os. Now he can't- he's not allowed to collect more in arka'os than he would have collected in din torah. Let's say in a din torah he would have collected five thousand dollars, and in arka'os he can collect ten thousand dollars, so he's only allowed to take five thousand. But l'ma'aseh to get his five thousand dollars, to get his hundred dollars, he is given a hetter to go to arka'os. The shaileh is, I don't know, for fifty dollars, you'd be given a hetter to go be mechalel hashem and go be מייקר שם עובדי עבודה זרה? Mai hai? How can that be? How can that be? So lichora the pshat- it's clear the pshat is like this. To have a system where a person can with perverse and brazen perversity and brazenness act shelo kedin and then our hands would be tied and not have recourse to deal with that is a bigger chillul hashem. It's a bigger chillul hashem than going to arka'os. That someone should brazenly be able to not pay his employee. And then the employee wants to take him to beis din. It's for a hundred dollars, but he worked hard, he wants the hundred dollars, he needs the hundred dollars. To say that kol zman that we're in galus, kol zman that we don't have a Torah'dik government where you have a beis din which has a koach hakfiah, that that kind of injustice can't be dealt with, can't be reined in, that's a bigger chillul hashem. That's a bigger chillul hashem. And that's why in such a situation there is a hetter arka'os. Maybe let's skip here to pasuk gimmel, veyatzah ishto imo. Talking about the eved ivri. So when the eved ivri completes his term of service, so he leaves the employ of the adon as does his wife. כתב רש"י וכי מי הכניסה שתצא? He was the eved, not her. אלא מגיד שהקונה עבד עברי חייב במזונות אשתו ובניו. U'midrash chachamim immo. Veyatzah ishto imo, so that's a makor for chayav bimzonos ishto. Where did Chazal get חייב במזונות אשתו ובניו, that the adon of the eved ivri is chayav not only mzonos eshes ha'eved but bnei ha'eved as well?

והכניסו עמו הבנים מכתוב שאמר אחריו ויצא מעמך הוא ובניו עמו

from the pasuk in Parshas Behar that you have a similar description of veyatzah and there it applies to the banim. ולא נתבאר לי בדין הזה says the Ramban,

אם מעשה ידי האשה והבנים לאדון כל הימים אשר יזון אותם.

Let's say the wife of the eved ivri is a seamstress. and she she makes money she earns money in in that capacity so to whom do those wages belong do the ma'aseh yadayim belong to the adon because he's supporting her or do they belong to the isha והנראה בעיני שהוא נכנס במקום הבעל the yesod hadin here that the adon is chayav bimzonos ishto uvanav is that the Torah relates to the adon as standing in the shoes of the ba'al why

כי חמלה התורה על האשה והבנים שחייהם תלויים להם מנגד מצפים מידי הבעל

so a wife and children are supported by their husband by their father ואחר שנמכר יאבדו בצרתם but now he doesn't take home a paycheck anymore he's an Eved Ivri so so it belongs to the adon ולכן ציווה השם האדון אשר הוא לוקח מעשה ידיו of the eved lihiyot lahem bimkomo so he assumes the responsibility of the eved for the eved's family for his wife and children

ואם כן לא יהיה על האדון אלא כחיוב הבעל בלבד

so the obligation of the adon will not exceed that of the ba'al now the ba'al what would happen what happens not what would happen what does happen a ba'al supports his wife so then he's entitled to her earnings since he since he has the responsibility to provide for her so then he's entitled to her earnings

ויקח מעשה ידיהם כאשר יעשה הבעל ויזון ויפרנס וזהו לשון ויצאה אשתו עמו כי הייתה אשת העבד עם בעלה כשפחה לאדון

she was also in a certain sense like a shifcha in that שמעשה ידי שניהם שלו והוא חייב במזונותיהם the only difference between the Eved Ivri and his wife

אין ביניהם אלא שהרשות ביד האשה ללכת לנפשה וכן הבנים אינו חייב להם במזונותיהם אלא בקטנותם בזמן שהאב מצווה או נוהג לזונם וכן פירש רש"י במסכת קידושין וכל זה חמלה מאת השם עליהם ועל העבד שלא ימות בצרתו בהיותו עמל בבית נכרי ובניו ואשתו יהיו נעזבים

let's read just a few more lines and then try to process this

ואף על פי שלא היה הוא מחוייב במזונותם מדין התורה כמו שנזכר בתלמוד בכתובות אבל כיון שדרך כל הארץ לפרנס אדם אשתו ובניו הקטנים ציווה האל ברחמיו להיות הקונה כאב רחמן להם וכוונת חכמים בבניו הבנים והבנות

so the Ramban finds out something here which is mamash hafle vafele it's a machlokes tannaim and the majority opinion as the Ramban later comments by she'er k'sus v'onah is that the chiyuv of a ba'al lazun ishto is only miderabbanan the Ramban takes issue with Rashi who translates she'er as mezonos and says that's a da'as yachid in Chazal the da'as rabbim in Chazal is that the chiyuv mezonos is only miderabbanan that the chiyuv mezonos of a ba'al l'ishto is only miderabbanan the Torah imposes that chiyuv mezonos eshes ha'eved ivri on the adon because even though there's no chiyuv min hatorah there's an expectation that he'll be doing it

ואף על פי שלא היה הוא מחוייב במזונותם מדין התורה

the Eved Ivri before he became an Eved Ivri he had no chiyuv d'oraisa he had no chiyuv d'oraisa to be zoneh ishto

אבל כיון שדרך כל הארץ לפרנס אדם אשתו ובניו הקטנים

so there's an expectation that he'll be doing it such a strong expectation adei kach that the Torah then transfers imposes that chiyuv Extraordinary thing. Something can not, the Torah can not legislate something, and yet clearly the Torah expects that we should do it. So I don't know what the klal is for when the Torah gives an explicit tzivuy, when the Torah leaves it as an expectation, but the implication is clear. The absence of a tzivuy doesn't mean that it's not a value, that it's not important, that it's not expected, that it's not quasi-obligatory. Because ad kdei kach that the Torah says the adon is מחויב במזונות אשת עבד עברי. Why? Because the adon has to step into the shoes of the ba'al who's mechuyav bimezonos ishto, but where there's an expectation, where there's an expectation that he will. And that also explains the Ramban understands that min haTorah the ma'aseh yadayim of the eshes eved Ivri belong to the eved Ivri, excuse me, belong to the adon. That din also that a ba'al is entitled to the ma'aseh yadayim of his wife as long as he's supporting her is also only a din d'rabbanan. Is also only a din d'rabbanan. But there too, no, there's an expectation. And you see a din d'Oraisa is built on this expectation, not stam, a good thing, no, the chiyuvim of eved Ivri reflect these expectations, which just speak to how high and how strong those expectations are. You have the Ritva in Kiddushin has the same idea. The Gemara is explaining here on daf daled, we have two psukim in the Torah. One tells us that if a father accepts kesef kiddusheh for his daughter, bito ktanah or bito ne'arah, the kesef go to him. Another is that the ma'aseh yadeha of his daughter go to him. But we need psukim for each. We can't derive one from the other.

ואיצטריך למיכתב קידושיה לאביה ואיצטריך למיכתב מעשה ידיה לאביה דאי כתב רחמנא קידושיה לאביה

hava amina משום דלא טרחא בהו she didn't work hard, she didn't exert herself, אבל מעשה ידיה דקטרחא בהו she exerted herself, eima didah havo. Now listen to this next line of Rabosai. ואי אשמעינן מעשה ידיה if the Torah would have told us that the father is entitled to the ma'aseh yadeha of his young daughter, she goes and she babysits, so he's entitled to that money, not a ne'arah when she's already that age and it doesn't belong to him. אבל מעשה ידיה דקמיתזנא מיניה oh, then we would have said, why is he entitled to ma'aseh yadeha? Because he supports her. אבל קידושיה דמעלמא קאתי לה אימא דידה הוו. So the Ritva says, what do you mean we would have said that he's entitled to ma'aseh yadeha because he supports her? That he gets her ma'aseh yadeha is a din d'Oraisa, but me'ikar hadin he's not mechuyav to support her. So the Ritva says the same thing. Yeah, there's no pasuk that says he's mechuyav to support her, but the expectation is that that's what parents do. The expectation is that the parents support their children. Not that they tell their children, no, I'm only mechuyav to support you until you're six years old and go start a new internet company or whatever and support yourself. The same thing, that we would have interpreted that he's entitled that the Torah awards him her ma'aseh yadeha because he's supporting her, even though there's no chiyuv because there is such an expectation. The absence of chiyuv of formal chiyuv doesn't mean that there isn't such an expectation. Okay, next step.