חמישה הן הנקראים מינים פרק ג' הלכות תשובה הלכה ז'. חמישה הן הנקראים מינים,
the Rambam mentioned that minim comprise one category of those שאין להם חלק לעולם הבא. חמישה הן הנקראים מינים: האומר שאין שם אלוה ואין לעולם מנהיג,
an atheist. והאומר שיש שם מנהיג אלא שהוא שנים או יותר, a polytheist. והאומר שיש שם ריבון אחד אלא שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה,
a corporalist, he thinks that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is physical. וכן האומר שאינו לבדו ראשון וצור לכל. He thinks that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not the source of everything that exists, is not prior to and the source of everything that exists. וכן העובד אלוה זולתו כדי להיות מליץ בינו ובין ריבון העולמים כל אחד מחמישה אלו מין,
or oved avodah zarah. So on the line of האומר שיש שם ריבון אחד אלא שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה,
amar Avraham, writes the Ra'avad, ולמה קרא לזה מין. וכמה גדולים וטובים ממנו הלכו בזו המחשבה לפי מה שראו במקראות ויותר ממה שראו בדברי ההגדות המשבשות הדעות.
So the word mimenu in Lashon Hakodesh has two different meanings. It can mean from him, right? If you want to say that, I don't know, one brother is older than his other brother by three years, you'd say הוא גדול ממנו בשלוש שנים. So it can mean from him or it can mean from amongst us, right? Ish mimenu, no one amongst us should do such and such. So you would say ish mimenu and then continue the sentence. So it's clear that the pshat in the Ra'avad is כמה גדולים וטובים ממנו. He's not saying that these people who believe that Hakadosh Baruch Hu was physical were greater than the Rambam. He's saying people who are gedolim vetovim amongst us. So that's just in terms of translating the words in the Ra'avad. Next, it's also clear that the Ra'avad obviously is in full agreement with the Rambam in terms of what the reality of Hakadosh Baruch Hu is, what our traditional belief is, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not ba'al guf because the Ra'avad attributes this view that some have subscribed to as being based on aggados hamshabshos hadei'os. He attributes it to shibush hada'as, so it's obviously the case that the Ra'avad in terms of the substance, that the view is minus, that the view is heresy, the Ra'avad agrees. Hasagas HaRa'avad is on classifying the person who holds that view as a min, right, not that the view is minus, but the Ra'avad says there should be some daylight between the fact that the view is minus doesn't automatically for the Ra'avad, it doesn't mean that it should translate into the person who subscribes to that belief as being a min if, but okay. Now next point in the Ra'avad is, you know, the Rambam in this halacha lists חמישה הן הנקראים מינים. So I think as we'll mention this bli neder again later a little bit more fully, I mean every oved avodah zarah also, well I don't know every, some of them are just fakers and it's a good business. But many oved avodah zarah, many oved avodah zarah believe in the avodah zarah that they worship. And yet the Ra'avad of the חמישה הן הנקראים מינים, the Ra'avad only massig on this. So it's not the case that the Ra'avad says that anytime a person is mistaken that the Ra'avad is massig and says ולמה קרא לזה מין, that even though the belief or the behavior is minus. that the Raavad limited and it's clear that that's what he means because he says that this is the only one where a person can make that mistake based on learning. A person learns Chumash and he doesn't have the proper teacher, so he sees Yad Hashem, he sees Einei Hashem, he sees those phrases and and he translates the eyes of Hashem, עיני ה' אלהיך בה, the eyes of Hakadosh Baruch Hu are are focused on Eretz Yisrael. Hayad Hashem Tiktzar, is something going to go something beyond the Hashem's the ability of his hand, of his arm. And what's more the Raavad says if you're learning Aggadah and imagine if if we have Aggadah so you know tohu va-vohu you turn back to the Maharsha because we don't know what to do with Aggadah. So imagine you're learning Aggadah so people in the Raavad's day this is before the Maharsha, right? You don't have the Maharsha, you don't have the Maharal, you don't have anything. So we don't know what to do with Aggadah the whole thing. If a person doesn't have some kind of guidance in learning Aggadah so it's meshabbesh et hadeiot, it's meshabbesh et hadeiot, but it's clear that the Raavad says what what allows for that distinction between the view being minus but the person not therefore being classified a min is the fact that one can arrive at that minus from Talmud Torah. But that's not true of the other things, right? It's not true of the other four hanikraim minim, which is why the Raavad doesn't think that there's any when it comes to those four there is no separation there's no there's no daylight between the view being minus and and the person subscribing to the view being a min. So the Raavad is very very narrow the hasagah is a very narrow hasagah davka on on this on this one. Let's shift gears for a minute and and focus on the Rambam. What's pshat in the Rambam in the fact that the Raavad's what the Raavad points out notwithstanding that misunderstanding pshuto shel mikra and misunderstanding aggadah can yield such a heretical error. So the Rambam holds there's never there's never daylight if if what a person believes is minus then he's a min. So lechora it's not so it's not as simple as that. So the Rambam in perek daled of Hilchos Shechitah. So at the end of halacha yud daled he writes as follows. So daled yud daled in Shechitah: ואם היה משומד לעבודת זרה, the person who shachts. ואם היה משומד לעבודת זרה או מחלל שבת בפרהסיא או מין והוא הכופר בתורה ובמשה רבנו כפי שביארנו בהלכות תשובה הרי הוא כגוי ושחיטתו נבלה.
Right? So that's sort of a categorical statement. Again: ואם היה משומד לעבודת זרה או מחלל שבת בפרהסיא או מין והוא הכופר בתורה ובמשה רבנו כפי שביארנו בהלכות תשובה הרי הוא כגוי ושחיטתו נבלה.
halacha tes zayin: אלו הצדוקין והביתוסין ותלמידיהן וכל התועים אחריהן שאינן מאמינים בתורה שבעל פה שחיטתן אסורה.
However, ואם שחטו לפנינו הרי זו מותרת, שאין איסור שחיטתן אלא שמא יקלקלו והן אינם מאמינים בתורת השחיטה לפיכך אינן נאמנין לומר לא קלקלנו.
So the chamesh Hilchos Shechitah are halacha Moshe mi-Sinai. Right? The Torah says Rashi quotes the Torah says... but it doesn't say anywhere what the hilchos shechitah are are not specified in Chumash. So what is the Torah referring to v'zavachta kaasher tzivisicha? So Rashi says no it's referring to the halacha Moshe m'Sinai where Hakadosh Baruch Hu taught Moshe Rabbeinu the chameish hilchos shechitah. Shehiyah, the shochet can't hesitate in the middle of the shechitah. It has to be one consecutive uninterrupted motion. It shouldn't be with pressure, it shouldn't be with drasha, it should be one again a slicing motion not a stabbing motion etc. chameish hilchos shechitah. So the Tzedukim and Baytusim don't believe in Torah she-ba'al peh. Because they don't believe in Torah she-ba'al peh so they have no ne'emanus to tell us that they shechted properly. But if a Yisrael, a ma'amin, was present and he witnessed the shechitah and he saw that the shechitah was done properly so then the shechitah's good. How is the shechitah good? Tzedukim and Baytusim are kofrim in the Torah, Torah she-ba'al peh, and therefore they qualify as the minim that the Rambam was talking about in halacha daled. You hear the question? K'murtal u'vessam? Yeah. So the Rav explains that it's clear it's clear that what the Rambam means here the Rambam has in mind the same distinction that he draws in Hilchos Mamrim. מי שאינו מאמין בתורה שבעל פה harei hu, I skipped a few words, הרי הוא בכלל המינים. Halacha that was halacha aleph. Halacha gimmel, Bamei devarim amurim and what's more minim again once upon a time what the din was moridin velo ma'alin. במה דברים אמורים פרק ג הלכה ג ממרים במה דברים אמורים באיש שכפר בתורה שבעל פה ממחשבתו ובדברים שנראו לו והלך אחר דעתו הקלה ואחר שרירות לבו וכפר בתורה שבעל פה תחילה.
He's a first generation kofer. Right? Kafer ba-Torah techilah he's a first generation kofer. וכן כל התועים אחריו meaning even if others are led astray by him but again but they're first generation right? They're first generation. They were raised with proper emunah and dei'os and then they choose to leave. Shanu u-peirushu. אבל בני אותם התועים ובני בניהם שהדיחו אותם אבותם ונולדו במינות וגדלו אותם עליו הרי הן כתינוק שנשבה לבין הגוים וגדלוהו הגוים על דתם שהוא אנוס.
Lefichach skipping a couple lines ראוי להחזירן בתשובה ולמשוך אותם בדרכי שלום. So the Rambam draws a distinction in how we relate to first generation again there he's talking about again Tzedukim, Baytusim, Kara'im same belief system. The term is just applied to different groups at different stages in history. He distinguishes between whether it's first generation or whether it's second or later second or later generation where they were brought up where they were born into it and brought up on that belief so then the Rambam says no we don't say moridin ve-ein ma'alin but aderaba we look to be mekareiv them. ראוי להחזירן בתשובה ולמשוך אותם בדרכי שלום. So the Rav said it's clear that the Rambam in Hilchos Shechitah is operating with a similar distinction in halacha daled in daled daled when he states categorically that the shechitah of a min is ke-toveich neveilah and it doesn't help if a Yisrael witnesses it. What does it help that the Yisrael witnesses that the shechitah was in terms of the technical execution was perfect if the person is disqualified from shechting? If his dino ke-goy so then he's disqualified from shechting. It doesn't make a difference that the technicalities of the shechitah were perfect. So that's what the Rambam's describing halacha daled. He's describing first generation. Eilu ha-Tzedukim. Why does Rambam say eilu? He should have said ha-Tzedukim ve-ha-Baytusim. Why eilu ha-Tzedukim? No the Rambam's saying eilu ha-Tzedukim ve-ha-Baytusim the ones that you'll meet on the if you go shpatziren in Cairo on the street the ones you're going to meet eilu ha-Tzedukim ve-ha-Baytusim. So the Rambam says they're not first generation. I don't know what generation they are, but they're not first generation. They're much later than that. So they don't have a din of a min, and therefore the problem is they have no ne'emanus. They have no ne'emanus in shechita. So שחטו בינן לבין עצמם שחיטתן אסורה, but if שחטו בפני ישראל והישראל רואה שהשחיטה היתה כראוי, so then shechitasan keshera. So you see klar that the pshat here in Hilchos Teshuvah in the machlokes between the Rambam and the Ra'avad is not that the Rambam categorically rejects what the Ra'avad says that it can be, it can be the case that a person believes in minus but he's not a min. But that's clearly not the case because because the Rambam himself operates with such a distinction in Hilchos Shechita. He says the second generation Tzedokim and Baiteisim, what they believe is minus, but they're not minim. They're not minim. Oh, so then what's the pshat here? So what what is the nekudas hamachlokes then here in Hilchos Teshuvah? So I'm not sure if could be there's gonna be some some gray area left when when when we finish. Specifically the Rambam's answer to the Ra'avad's hasaga, I don't know that there's any basis for for thinking there is such a legend but but it's presumably legend and not fact that the Rambam saw the Ra'avad's hasagos. There is such a legend but it's it's a legend. But he was clearly aware of this question, not because the Ra'avad's hasagos reached him, but he was clearly aware of this question because the Rambam himself writes, explains why he doesn't think a mistake about corporeality is a defense and and why that would again be some kind of mitigating factor. I mean it's true, if you just learn Chumash and you translate the psukim literally, so you'll think Hashem is physical. And that's true and if you learn Aggadeta and you don't recognize that Aggadeta speaks in metaphorical terms and again and you you translate it literally so you'll have all kinds of crazy notions in your head, right? That's why it's a very very bad idea for for people to learn Kabbalah who are not ra'uy lachach because there's all kinds of metaphorical leshonos which if a person doesn't understand them correctly he's much worse off for having misunderstood them than for just being unaware of what it says. The reason it's, the reason it is chochmas hanistar is because it's supposed to be nistar from most of us and it's supposed to be reserved for yechidei segula. It's not it's not a, it's not some kind of game of hide and seek that it's chochmas hanistar. It's chochmas hanistar for for a reason. And it's not at all the case that if a person, well, you know, you know, nothing ventured, so there is a very, very, very, very real downside to it. So the Rambam explains as follows. The Rambam says that that the reason ignorance isn't a defense for a person who thinks Hakadosh Baruch Hu is a ba'al guf. Again what the Ra'avad points out in terms of psukim in Chumash, in terms of Aggadeta, he doesn't mention Aggadeta explicitly, but he talks about mistake, he doesn't mention the psukim. specifically either. But he talks about again mistake and misunderstanding. He says the reason that that's not defense is, and and this is such a important yesod not only in this context, in in life. He says the Torah doesn't make a demand that everyone should be a philosopher and that everyone should know how to on their own, how to reason that it's inconceivable that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is a ba'al guf. There's no such, no such expectation. The Torah doesn't expect everyone to be a Rabbi Akiva, a Rambam, a Rav Chaim. There's no such, no such expectation. But what the Torah does expect, and and this is so, you can't, you can't underline this or or bold it strongly enough. The Torah does expect from everyone to know what his own limitations are. And and the person who isn't capable on his own of arriving at a correct conception of elokus is expected to know that. He's expected to know what his limitations are. He's expected to know where his abilities lie and where they don't lie. What what he's able to to tackle on his own and what he's not able to tackle on his own. And he should be deferring to people who know better. And that's why the Rambam says that, that's why the Rambam doesn't go for this 'well he just misunderstood'. So who told him to to rely on himself? No one's blaming him for not being able to figure it out on his own, but the responsibility, the blame is in taking upon oneself to to arrive, to arrive at at these conclusions on on one's own. That's what the Rambam says explicitly in terms of, and then he give, he says, Ve-ha-raya that that logic is absolutely compelling, this is what we mentioned before, is that by and large ovdei avodah zarah believe in the avodah zarah they're engaged in. So you see the fact that they believe in it isn't, doesn't exonerate them. They can still have the din of meizid. That they still have a din of meizid and and would be חייב מיתת בית דין because who tells them to to abide by by their belief and not to defer to to those who who know better? Now the implications of what the Rambam says, and again, here's where the, here where there is some gray area. So he says that explicitly again about corporeality. And l'chora with regard to corporeality, let's say a person grows up either in a society where there is no such individual who understands better, or where there's no realistic expectation for him to recognize that person for who he is, so then it sounds like from the Rambam in that kind of extreme situation that the Rambam would agree with the Ravad because then based on on the explanation that that the Rambam gives. But then the question is, so how, where does that apply, where doesn't it apply? Let's say a person who grew up in the Soviet Union in the 1930s when the Rav zichrono l'vracha used to say that it's not the pshat that communists are also atheists, it's at the core, the core of communism is atheism because they try to make the state becomes the absolute that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is. So it's not pshat that they they're also also atheists, that they have they have these theories about I don't know class war based on Marx and and other things and they also happen to be atheists. No, that's the essence of It's at the heart of communism. There is no communism without atheism. Let's say you have someone who grew up in, I don't know, grew up in Stalinist, Stalinist Russia and he's an atheist, so what would the Rambam say about that? I don't know what he would say about that. Maybe a person in sevarah, maybe in sevarah not everyone can figure out that Hashem is not a ba'al guf, but maybe everyone in sevarah is supposed to recognize Ribono shel Olam. So exactly, you know, where you draw the lines, it's only nogaya l'dina, you know, if such a person touches the wine, if such a person shechts, or such a person signs as an ed on a get or something. Otherwise, we're not asking the question to sit in judgment, but it would be in any of those kinds of circumstances it would be halacha l'ma'aseh as well. Is the Rambam talking about cases where Tzedukim or Baitusim or people that by and large live in a society of ovdei Hashem, they just happen to be secluded into their own kind of private community as opposed to someone let's say lives in Soviet Russia who is mamash a tinok shenishba who would have had no way of access? So he continues, he says here in Gimel Gimel in Mamrim, after he says הרי הן כתינוק שנשבה לבין הגויים וגידלוהו הגויים על דתם שהוא אנוס ואף על פי ששמע אחר כך שהיה יהודי וראה היהודים ודתם הרי הוא כאנוס שהרי גידלוהו על טעותם.
So he says explicitly, you know, even if he later, I mean he was raised, he was hidden with a Christian family during the Second World War and then they refused to give him back and they didn't and they didn't tell him and they didn't tell him who he was and he finds out later, finds out later that no, that he was a Jewish baby hidden and and they shmatted him, but the Rambam says no, he still remains הרי הוא כאנוס שהרי גידלוהו על טעותם because they poisoned his mind in his formative years. So he's not referring to that his whole life he lives, you know, sort of secluded, but it means that during his formative years he's subjected to that kind of programming. So again the Rambam clearly thinks that that's relevant to not believing in Torah she'ba'al Peh. Implicitly by saying that the fault of the individual who thinks Hashem rachmana litzlan is a ba'al guf, the Ra'avad's note notwithstanding, is because he should have deferred to someone who knows better. So implicitly the Rambam is saying that if he didn't have access to such a person or for some reason wouldn't be in a position to recognize that person for who he is, for what he is, the Rambam seems to say that that also would would be a mitigating factor. So we sort of know it in terms of the ikkar of ba'al guf and we know it in terms of Torah she'ba'al Peh. What about the other ikkarim? I don't know. You know the same way the Ra'avad was only massig on ba'al guf, yitachen that even the Rambam's partial agreement is only on ba'al guf, that the Rambam wouldn't say it about a person who's an atheist. Ayen lo. It's not obvious that, it's certainly not obvious to extend it to someone who's an atheist, not obvious at all. Ayen lo. The yesod harvii says the Rambam hakadmos והוא שזה האחד האמור again Hakadosh Baruch Hu of whom we've been speaking in the previous three yesodos שזה האחד האמור הוא הקדמון בהחלט וכל נמצא זולתו הוא בלתי קדמון ביחס אליו.
Hakadosh Baruch Hu is prior to everything else because everything else draws its existence from him. והראיה הזאת בספרים הם רבות. והיסוד הרביעי הזה הוא שהורה עליו באומרו מעונה אלוקי קדם.
That's what it means when we refer to Hakadosh Baruch Hu as Elokei Kedem. Vada, this is I think Toby pointed out here in the notes, I assume. Rav Kapach has it in his as well. This the Rambam added later in that they can see in the manuscripts that he added this later. ודע כי היסוד הגדול של תורת משה רבינו הוא שהעולם הוא מחודש.
It's a fundamental principle of belief that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world. The world was not eternal. The world has not always existed. יצרו השם ובראו אחר ההעדר המוחלט. There was absolutely there was nothingness in terms of the world. And Hakadosh Baruch Hu created it. וזה שאתה רואה אותי מקיף את ענין קדמותו לפי דעת הפלוסופים
at times the Rambam says you'll see that when I talk about that, I don't take that for granted. הוא כדי להחליט המופת על מציאותו יתעלה כמו שביארתי והערתי במורה.
Right? That's how you know it's a later addition because he wrote Perush Hamishnayos decades before he wrote the Moreh. The Rambam what this Rambam means is as follows. The Rambam was of the opinion, you know, whether he would change this given today's science as opposed to the science of his day is a question, but leaving that aside, the Rambam was of the opinion that you couldn't prove whether the world was created or not. The Rambam said that you couldn't prove, meaning logically, you can sort of prove historically based on miracles, but logically, you know, in terms of constructing a logical proof, the Rambam was of the opinion that you couldn't prove that the world had been created, that there was no logical way of choosing between those two views whether the world was created or whether the world had always existed. Rav Saadia Gaon thought you could. So for Rav Saadia Gaon who thought that you could prove that the world had been created, so then mimeila that served as a proof for Metzius Hashem. The Rambam says that again, you can prove it historically but then proof there means something different. Right? The Rambam's talking about a logical proof, you know, the kind of like a proof that you learn in geometry, that kind of proof. Not logical in terms of formal logic, not logical in terms of makes sense and compelling and truthful, but in terms of formal logic. So the Rambam says at times I talk in terms of the world being kadmon, because that way I give you a proof for Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence, an absolute proof because then mah nafshach. If you recognize the world as being mechudash, then that's the biggest proof of Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence. And even if you don't grant that, so I'll show you how even without granting that, you can still prove Metzius Hashem. That's what the Rambam is saying 100%. It's again, it's the thirteenth of the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim. Techiyas Hamaysim the Rambam says is basically a yesod of miracles, and miracles is only possible if the world was created. If the world has always existed and everything about the world is inexorable, everything about the world is the way it is because it has to be that way. If Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world, so then the world doesn't have to be, which is why there can be exceptions, which is why there can be and they have been and there are miracles. But the Rambam says all that we know empirically, but you can't sort of just know it if you keep your eyes closed and don't look at miracles happening, you can't know that logically. And if you want to be able to prove Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence logically, so then you need to prove it even al hatzad that the world is kadmon, that the world has always existed. That's what these lines mean. Okay, we'll stop here.