What one of the defining features of the Malbim's Peirush is the remarkable sensitivity to the patterns and symmetry within Nach. So for instance, here the Malbim sensitizes us in Kapitol Beis that already beginning in Pasuk Alef there were two strands למה רגשו גוים ולאמים יהגו ריק and those two strands he explains to us continue in the next two psukim as well that the revolt, the rebellion is על ה' ועל משיחו and it is expressed in the twin goals of Nenatka mosrosaimo Venashlicha mimenu avosaimo. So we saw yesterday that the Malbim explains the difference between goy and le'om is that goy is just a mass of people who are organized into a political unit and le'om is a mass of people who what defines them as a body is not just this sort of political union that they form but a religion, a religious belief to which they subscribe and the revolt is both just political, is both political and religious. For whatever reason in the next pasuk it's inverted, it's על ה' ועל משיחו. It's against HaKadosh Baruch Hu, the religious, what David HaMelech enforced in terms of religion and al meshicho rejecting just his kingship on the political level. Nenatka mosrosaimo we'll undo his bonds, venashlicha mimenu avosaimo we'll throw off avosaimo. Nenatka the Malbim explains עבותות הם חזקות יותר ממוסרות. They're stronger than moseros. They're both cords, they're both bonds but the avosos שהם מוסרות הקלועים יחד ואי אפשר לנתקם, they're multiple moseros braided together so they're so strong it's impossible to undo them. So yomru shemoseros hachalushim the relatively weaker cords so that they can break them, they can undo them. However, ve-avosos hachazakim so that they have to throw off, they can't cut through again in the metaphor, they can't cut through the cords, they can't cut through the bonds but they just throw the bonds off, yashlichu me'al tzavareimo. The different verbs corresponding to the two different nouns. Now this two-pronged attack וזה בין בעניין הדת both in terms of their religious revolt as well as the political revolt. What's the nimshal to the moseros and the avosos religiously? וזה בין בעניין הדת שמצוות שאין להם טעם, no known intuitive reason, veyecholim lehashiv aleihem and as it were they on the level of seichel enoshi can push back against them. Yevatlum, that's the analog to nenatka, lenatek to undo. However, ומצוות השכליות החזקות בטעמם. Where there isn't any quote enlightened unquote argument to make against Mitzvos Sikhliyos, which are compelling, that Chazakos B'ta'amam, so that just again that they can't undo the cord, so Yashlikhu acharei geivam. They just, they just reject it without putting forth some alleged alternate moral argument. Now the question is, now earlier in the Kapitol what we saw yesterday that the rebellion against Hashem took the form of לפרוק עול הדת ושבע מצוות שהפקידם דוד לקיימם. The only thing that Dovid Hamelech imposed upon the Goyim, the Le'umim in Eretz Yisroel was Sheva Mitzvos. And yet the Malbim speaks of that there were two types of Mitzvos against which they were rebelling: Mitzvos, not only Mitzvos Sikhliyos, but מצוות שאין להם טעם as well. So lichora the mashma'us is that the Malbim is saying is that both of those types are represented within the Sheva Mitzvos. Because he wasn't telling them that they couldn't wear Shaatnez. He wasn't telling them to be makriv a Seir L'Azazel. He was telling them that they have to abide by שבע מצוות בני נח. So the Rambam writes in Hilkhos Melakhim: שישה דברים נצטווה אדם הראשון: על עבודה זרה, ועל ברכת השם, ועל שפיכות דמים, ועל גילוי עריות, ועל הגזל, ועל הדינים. אף על פי שכולן קבלה הן בידינו ממשה רבינו.
So there's a tradition that Moshe Rabbeinu transmitted to us the tradition that all of humanity are bound by these Mitzvos. V'hadass noteh lahem. And what's more, they're also, right, they're rational Mitzvos. V'hadass noteh lahem. It's something to which one would be inclined mi-sekhel. Then the Rambam says and yet a third, on a third level, it's even mashma in the Torah she-biksav, מכלל דברי התורה יראה שאלו נצטווה. So the question is whether our Malbim again who seems to be identifying within the corpus of שבע מצוות בני נח not only Mitzvos Sikhliyos but also מצוות שאין להם טעם. So that means that he disagrees with this Rambam. So two possibilities. The first is that the Rambam makes this comment before he mentions Eiver Min HaChai which was first given to Noach, right? The Rambam in d'lo k'Tosafos. Tosafos in Sanhedrin understand that the Mitzvah of Eiver Min HaChai was already given to Adam HaRishon even though Adam HaRishon wasn't allowed to kill an animal to anyway to eat. No, but if the animal would have died on its own he could eat it. But what happens if a limb fell off of it in its lifetime? So it's still, there was still a nafka mina for Adam HaRishon to know the din of Eiver Min HaChai. That's how Tosafos in Sanhedrin understands. The Rambam clearly disagrees and the Rambam says no, that הוסיף לנח אבר מן החי שנאמר אך בשר בנפשו דמו לא תאכלו נמצאו שבע מצוות.
So the question is does the Rambam's characterization of hadass noteh... Was the Rambam intend that to carry over to ever min hachai? When he obviously intends the כולן קבלה הם בידינו to carry over, and he certainly intends in the klal de-Orayta because he quotes the pasuk of אף בשר בנפשו דמו לא תאכלו, but what about hadas notal lahem? So arguably, if the Rambam's, if that entire sentence was relevant to ever min hachai as well, so the Rambam maybe you should have held that, held off until he should have written ששת דברים נצטווה אדם הראשון, all six, הוסיף לנח אבר מן החי, and then אף על פי שכולן קבלה הם בידינו, so yitachein that the Rambam's characterization of hadas notal lahem doesn't apply to ever min hachai. Because ever min hachai doesn't necessarily mean, the איסור אבר מן החי doesn't mean that the person has to be the one who ripped the limb off the living animal. It could be that the two animals were fighting and and that was inflicted by another animal, so it's not that the person is being cruel, it's not, not necessarily. So yitachein that that that the Rambam's characterization of hadas notal lahem doesn't apply to ever min hachai, in which case there isn't necessarily a difference of opinion here between the Rambam and our Malbim. But the emes is that yitachein me'od that that yitachein that the Malbim is is following through on what we saw in kapitel aleph, when we saw that ki haseichel ha-enoshi. Again, the tzaddik is כעץ שתול על פלגי מים, right? The tzaddik is is metaphorically compared to a tree which is planted on near brooks of water that it will always have whatever it needs, it will never lack. And and the Malbim explained that the nimshal is that even the yesharim va-adasam of the pilosofim asher, we saw this line together, אשר התנהגו בצדק וחסד על פי נימוסים שכליים לא מצאו תמיד די סיפוקם.
They sometimes they went hungry, they were lacking. כי השכל האנושי ילאה, the seichel ha-enoshi will get worn up and doesn't successfully מקלוע אל המטרה תמיד ויטה ברוב משפטיו, right? And we saw the Malbim at the end of Tehillim, mishpatam al yadam. So yitachein that the Malbim taki does disagree with with the Rambam, or at least, or I don't know, maybe he would tell us to modify our understanding of the Rambam that yeah, hadas notal lahem, they think shfichus damim is bad, but abortion's okay. They think shfichus damim is bad, but euthanasia's okay. So then even within the sheva mitzvos, even within the ששת מצוות שנצטווה אדם Adam HaRishon, the Malbim here in kapitel beis is telling us, I mean it's the same mitzvah, the מצוות שאין להם טעם and the mitzvos hasichliyos. Maybe the the same mitzvos in terms of just what the parameters of and the details of the mitzvah are. וכן בעניין העבדות יפרקו עולה. Okay. יושב בשמים ישחק ה' ילעג למו. The Malbim explains that that this is the end of the question, right? Lama rageshu goyim, the kapitel begins with a question. And the Malbim says the question mark is is at the midpoint of our pasuk. Lama rageshu goyim, how can it be that the goyim are rebelling? And yosheiv bashamayim yischak and and HaKadosh Baruch Hu is is watching this brazen rebellion and. He's laughing kavyachol. He doesn't seem to be outraged. He's laughing. He's not intervening. He's not punishing. So here's where the question mark comes: Lama Ragshu Goyim and... and the Ribono Shel Olam who's yoshev bashamayim is yis'chak. The answer is Hashem yil'ag lamo. That what seems to be shchok is... is really HaKadosh Baruch Hu mocking them. The Malbim explains as follows: Chazal say tov kaas mis'chok, tov kaas, reading the Malbim one line into halacha daled. Tov kaas mis'chok, טוב כעס שהקדוש ברוך הוא כועס על הצדיקים בעולם הזה.
A person, it's much better for a person to endure, to experience the kaas, the anger that HaKadosh Baruch Hu has on tzadikim in Olam Hazeh mis'chok from the frivolity שהקדוש ברוך הוא משחק על הרשעים. כי השחוק יש לו עניין מיוחד מכל המידות.
There's something singular about shchok. שבכל המידות לא ישווה השינוי בין הפועל והמתפעל. There's complete congruence between the the subject and the object. Hapo'el yichas, the person who grows angry, he's anger, he's angered, he's venting his anger, vehamispel, the object, yekabel onesh, is feeling the the wrath, right? The po'el, the subject, is venting his wrath and the mispel, the object, is at the receiving end of the wrath. So there's congruence between the subject and the object, the po'el and the mispel. Hapo'el yerachem, the judge has rachmanus, vehamispel, the defendant, yerucham. He ends up having been dealt with compassionately. לא כן השחוק על רעהו, hasochek al re'eihu. Hasochek al re'eihu, so that can be deceptive. That's deceptive. הפועל שוחק ונדמה שטוב לבו. It looks like he's laughing, like he's playing along, but vehamispel ultimately yekabel busha uchlima. But it's but it's only it's only a facade. ועל כן המשיל בזה שחוקת הרשעים. שאף גם שנראה שהשם שוחק ואינו כועס עליהם.
It seems like like the rasha'im have a free hand. It but ultimately המה מקבלים בזה אך כלימה וחרפה. Ultimately, this it's just shame and humiliation that will overtake them. ומה שיגדל עונשם פתאום כשיושלם ששונם. So the answer to yoshev bashamayim yis'chak is because that's only as it were what appears outwardly, but actually it's Hashem yil'ag lamo and as the as the next pasuk continues. The Malbim here is touching on a on a very, very important yesod. You know, one of the ikarim of of of Yahadus is sachar ve'onesh. אני מאמין באמונה שלמה שהבורא יתברך שמו גומל טוב לשומרי מצוותיו ומעניש לעוברי מצוותיו.
The Rambam writes that the leading reason for people to lose emuna. The Rambam didn't live in an age of materialism where people were so busy with material matters that they didn't think so. He didn't know our didn't know our world, didn't know our society. But he said that that the leading reason that people lose emuna or get mixed up, messed up in emuna is because of the phenomenon of rasha vetov lo. Itachen that comment underlines within the Yud Gimmel Ikarim, when you look in the hakdama of Perek Chelek, so the Rambam doesn't only state what we have in the Ani Ma'amin. the abridged version, but the Rambam makes a point of saying that the makom, the ikar makom kabbalas schar v'onesh is in olam haba. Meaning, the Rambam is, is addressing this question, that it seems to us at times, it seems to any thoughtful person at times, that hachush machshish. We look around and we don't see—we see what seems to be derech reshaim tzleicha. So that's why the Rambam adds within the Yud Gimmel Ikarei, when he states the ikar sechar va'onesh, that the ikar, that the ikar, the, the point at which that happens is in olam haba, which is why what one sees in olam hazeh is not, is not rachmana litzlan hachush machshish. The Malbim is, is again very much talking in, in that vein also of how appearances are deceiving in that respect. The Malbim says that, that sometimes it will become clear even in olam hazeh, because what the Malbim is describing is not only that, that in olam haba, the, the rasha, the, the goyim, and the, and the leumim will get their up and coming, but, but even in olam hazeh: ובמשך יגדל עונשם פתאום כשימלא ששון. So that's obviously a, a crucial added element that sometimes it's even here, but the more importantly, the, the common denominator is that the belief in sechar va'onesh is predicated upon that we don't necessarily know what Hakadosh Baruch Hu's timetable for, for that is, and, and what all the considerations for the timetable. And that's what the Rambam says, and the ikar is, is in olam haba. Even when it happens to a degree in olam hazeh, so we don't know what, what the Ribono Shel Olam's cheshbonos are as to the timing. When does it mean that, that the middah of erech apayim for the reshaim has, has been exhausted? And, and that's why the we do have the, the deceiving appearances. Okay, let's stop.